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cncuuragemem or suppim of private discrimination on the one hand from 
(permissible) neutral 1oleration on the other. Judge Posner's words quoted earlier Ifrom the hostile environment discrimination case help make the point: states 
often deny the equal protection of the laws not by acting, but by omitting to 
act against private discriminatory action within such areas of responsibility as a 
government workplace. The point becomes more forceful as, with the growth 
uf th<; modem welfare and regulatory state, government's sphere of activity 
bro:~dens, and increased supervision of areas of private conduct brings with it 
more responsibility for that conduct.sl · 
Further, when we look beyond formal constitutional doctrine, we find that 

our actual civil-rights practices place little weight on th~ _public-private distinction. 

The social condemnation of a fonn of discrimination as invidious brings it 

wi_thin the anti-discrimination principle. This principle typically leads both to 

judicial prohibition of the official forms of prejudice and legislative prohibition 

where it appears "privately" in employment, housing, education, and public 

:u.:commodations. By contrast, our civil-liberties practices exhibit no parallel 

tendency toward .legislative protection of Nazis, Klansmen, and flag-burners 

a~ainst private discrimination. "Tolerance," a civil-rights word, and "toleration," 

a <:i,·il-liberties word, name quite different values. 

And as I have already stressed, the civil-rights approach likewise docs not 

sharply distinguish betwee·n speech and actjon. "Sticks and stones may break 

my bones, but words will never hurt me" - which expresses in homely fonn 

the f-irst Amendment's 13r:mdeisi:in ideal of self-reliant civic courage51 - does 

not apply "within a. framework of analysis in which the central injury to be 

avnidcd is stigma and humiliation - injury to a socially constructed (and hence 

socially destructible) personality. Words and symbols arc among the chief weapons 

for inflicting this forn1 of injury. The point becomes clear when one reads the 

f:~cts of some of the hostile environment discrimination cases; anyone will agree 

with Judge Posner that the Yictims in these cases have suffered discrimination 

in "terms and condi tions of employment" as surely as if they had been made 

to do extra work for the s:~mc pay on account of tl1eir rnce or sex.n 

~~"ll>u< in Slorllry r·. ~o.·'""""· lH U.S. l (l9~R), ntensi•c lcr;•l •up<nition of the klnd• of cnrorceobk 
Cm en>RU 1\tnnin~ wilh tht bnd rendered cn(orccmcnl of a nclaJ(y rcUrktiYe pri'riiC <OYCnutl dlscrlmiJIIIOfJ 
\Ute >Ciion ; in 7"rrry r. A""'"'· HS U.S. 461 (19SJ), cncruive stale rcJUialion or tlcclloM rendered the exclUJionuy 
pnrcit•<' nl the lorm•ll~ rn\"IIC T nu J•)·bird l>cmucrotic Club (in cfTectthe white nemocrotic Pony) dlscrimlruiO<)' 
\111< >Ctio,n ; in ll•rrmt ,.. Wilm iwpM Porn•~ --f~IAon"!r· ll>S U-"· 715 (1961). public owncnhip and opontlon or 
' p1<~in~ ~·uge (constitution>II)· cnt>nglcJ the nate In the ucbl crclusinn pucticcd by a pn\•ately-owneJ ruuuranl 
lc>Jin~ 'J'•Cc in the buil~ing. 
I• Sec the l>nt"ngc from Ju,oticc Oran~eis's opinion in 117oit•<1 t·. C41ifomisl. quoted In text accompanylns note 
l~ >N"'e. • 
,, Thu' in 8oAl"'> ••• F.sul C~it~(.O. the rhintifT, a female fire department dispatcher. h•d to d<>l with a IUp<rvio« 
""" ,..,. c••nst>ntly "<p<>king to her enrircly o( scru>l manen and d~ribina his prcfcncd sc:rual poaltlo!la. 
1\uhtn"c r llnkiruliun, an.J hi' C''W'pCCI.Iiliun~ (nt hC'r bth:avinr: f"unhcr. she w·u ... conrinual fatltl for obJcnw 
l•om.mcnl\ h) firelighter• lOll hthcr m>lc empluycn and .... r,.,ccd 10 listen 10 their filthy ullr. and dcscrlpdonl 
.,f their \C<U>l f>nt>)i(\ nf which she ,..,. the object.• A r.rc cap11ln told her thJt "• rorcihlc Df'C' In some nearby 
n........uiJ impro« l'>tr dis('<l\ilinn.· 7~'1 f .ld. I'll· 1182-83. 
In l :t:()(: t· . • ti•'!'AJ" .llnror frntAr l.inn. ~gR F. Surr . 3ft I (D. !\linn. 1980), Ray Wells, • bl1ck dodman, 
"'" •ul>jcCicd rc~"\lbrly to uci•l 1lun on ch>l~loo>rds anil<hed to lo>ding coru; "Ray Wells is 1 nlner." "The 
These same hostile environment discrimination cases likewise provide some 
of the best examples of civil rights analysis that blur the "speech-action" as 
well as the "public-private" distinction. When a private employer is held liable 
under Title VII for not taking reasonable steps to prevent racist or sexist verbal 
assaults by employees on their fellow workers, ·the government is in effect 
imposing (as sovereign, not employer) a content- and viewpoint-specific regime 
of censorship on the speech of private employees. The American Civil Liberties 
Union has seen the point; it opposes liability for employers or schools who fail 
to prevent verbal sexual harassment that "has no other effect on its recipient 
than to create an unpleasant working [learning) environment."S6 But I have 
found that many good civil-libertarians see these hostile environment cases (at 
least In the employment context) through the ·civil-rights lens; tl1ey thus agree 
with current law in accepting that an employer should be obligated to police 
the workplace to some extent against even purely verbal abuse when it becomes 
so pervasive and differentially "unpleasant" on grounds of race or sex to affect 
~mployees' terms and conditions of employment. 
IV 
I have tried to suggest how the civil-liberties :~nd civil-rights approaches 
overlap and clash on the issue of discriminatory harassment; apparently, no 
higher principle of comparable force and vitality can resolve their conflict. 57 Do 
these two approaches simply represent, respectively, right- and left-wing political 
tendencies within American liberalism? It is possible to tell the story that way: 
civil-liberties (and its marketplace of idc:~s) tl1en represents a ~ying classical 
liberalism, while civil-rights (and its society of equal groups) reprcscnt.s a post- · 
liber:1l social democracy struggling to be born. Or (to Oip the political poles of 
the historical plot-line) civil liberties now represents the true liberal future at 
this moment of tl1e end of history, while the asymmetric civil-rights project will 
be rejected along with other misguided attempts to inject communitarinn ideals 
into the legal governance of free societies. 
Both of these sketches operate on tl1e "contradiction" hypotl1csis; they postulate, 
on the basis of the structural conflict between the civil-rights and civil-liberties 
approaches, that one should give way in the name of principled consistency. 
Following tl1is analysis, one could press (from Ule right) toward a more fonnal 
ooly cood nincr Is a dead nincr." "Nincn arc • Uvintr ex.ample that lmli>ns screwed buiT•lo.· When Wells 
atancd eatinr In another room, hio while co-worken w.·ore "nin.:n only" above the door. Man>zemcnt did 
1101hlnr In response to compl>!nLS. Sec pp.· 38-4-SS. 
14 Polily Cuik oftAufCLU (rev. cd. 1989), at H2, 400.. The ACLU ('<lSirion requires distinguishing between 
ljmxc<ted) vcrlt>l >busc th•t merely rcndcn the cnviron<Ocnt "unpleu•nt" and th11 which crosses the liric to 
lanlctins octionable emotional distrcu - l'>ardly o brisht line. My th•nks to N•dinc Stro<scn fnr rroviding me 
dot tm of these ACLU provisions. 
11 Which Is not to uy that verbal (ormul>e m>y not be oiTrrcd tn •urrty furm>l or >Uthetic resolution to libcnl 
tlotory and hence present It u a clcned S)"11crn. John R•wh anempts such a dosll<c with his lcalol orderin~ ol 
lbcny oY<r equal opponunhy In A Tlrro? •f]•llltr: the difficulty Is to defend the subsconcc or this firm hicnr<hy. 
}oocph Ru suM>llcs an anncrivc ovenrching account or ">utonomy• as thr surrcmc libcnl ••luc, resolving 
~-cquoliry connicb, In Tlrr Mor~liry •f fmJt.m. I m)'\tlf prefer the fnnk pluulism or h•i•h Ucrlin in "Twn 
<Anccpu of Libcny," Fo•r £u•1• .., Librny. pp. 167-72 (London: <hfard, 1969). 
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and neutral "L•vil-liberqcs" style of anti-discrimination law or {from the left) I 
toward a more substantive and result-oriented "civil-rights" version of free 
speech law. 
The former move would incline toward an ideal of formal neutrality in civil­
rights law, one that stressed not the abolition of caste or status-subordination 
but the elimination from law of "suspect classifications" - distinctions based 
upon individuals' immutable characteristics. The latter move would give a larger 
role in First Amendment law to correction of market imperfections in the 
marketplace of ideas, pursuing policies such as realistically equal access to 
media, opening debate to the participation of those previously silenced by social 
subordination, and so on. As this essay perhaps suggests, I am more inclined 
to go in the latter directjon than in the former, but I am not inclined to go 
very far~8 - nothing like far enough to bring civil-liberties law into full consistency 
with the public-private and speech-action treatments characteristic of current 

civil-rights law. 

What, then, is the alternative .to seeing this incommensurable conflict as 

contradiction? My answer is already implicit in the body of the essay; it can be 

roughly captured by the slogan that the civil-rights approach embodies a proj((f, 

which is to be carried on within a framework constituted by the civil-liberties 

approach. Civil rights has statable social goals, however utopian: the abolition 

of racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry. It postulates disease-like social 

conditions and collective enemies; it then sets us the task of struggling against 

these and, ideally, eliminating them. The civil-rights mentality represents our 

collective self-commitment to a definite, though limited and negative, judgment 

about the nature of the good society, or at least the good society for us - it is 

one without castes (whether of race, or sex, or sexual orientation, or ...). Civil­

rights Ia~ is then conceived mainly as an instrumrol toward that end. 
Note that this instrumental account of civil-rights doctrine characterizes even 

those who arc unhappy with affirmative action and who tend to support a 

symmetric version of anti-discrimination law. First, in my experience, few 

adherents of this view support a wholehearted symmetry in practice. Second, 

the reason for this shows up in their arguments; they oppose affirmative action 

as counter-productive, as a poor strategy in the effort to attain what all concede 

to be the long-run goal: a caste-free society. To usc race as a principle for 

distributing burdens and benefits, they argue, is to legitimize it as a ground for 

social action; this reinforces the tendency to revert to less benign uses in 

moments of social panic or pressure. These neutralists on civil rights are thus, 

at bottom, instrumentalists too; they share the same conception of tl1c overriding 

goal, only disagreeing on the best means by which to pursue it. 59 

~~"I hu< I S)mp>thiT.C ,.;th (),.en Fi,,,·s surgcsrinns for moving First Amcndmcnl docuinc in. more rcalisrically 
·· dcm•"-ntic dirccrinn in his "Free Sp<·c<h amJ S<:><:i>l ScruciUr<,- lorN/..... Rn·itTP. vol. 71 (1986). p. t.fOS. Oa 

the other hand, I stnp shun uf cnJur.lin~ chil-righu-hucd bans on p<>ccnlia.lly broad content-de lined cstc,.,Ot11 

.,r 'i'«<h: raci\1 >f'<"ech, as endorsed by llhri 1\huud•. -l'ubllc Ruponse"; or scxlu pomognrhy, u in lhc 

trani,·Lin~ pro,·isions uf the Indianapolis >nti-pomographr ordlrnncc irwalid>tcd In lfmrrir4n DO!I!:ullm Au•• 1\ 

/luJ""'· 77t F.2d JZJ (7th Cir. t985). 

"Thus in the moSI "ncutulisl- of' recent Supreme Court ci1il-righu decisions. Ci(Y of Rirhmond 11. J- .•. 
! 
' : 
·. 
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The civil-liberties approach, whether in its . right- or left-wing versions, 
postulates no goal for society in the same sense. What would society look like 
if the "aims" of the First Amendment were achieved? It would be a society 
where people coult.l in general say what they have tn say, hut this merely restates 
First Arnent.lmcnt dtlctrinc in summary form without articulating a social goal 
at which it aims. Attempts to state positive goals for the First Amendment 
typically produce vague and edcctic wish-lists that arc of little help in shaping 
free speech doctrine. A similar point could be made, I believe, of the free 
exercise clause and some aspects of the right of privacy. We cannot say anything 
very definite about how society would look if these civil-libertarian rights were 
fully realized. 
We might fairly say that these provisions aim at an open society, but that is 
to say only that they aim :ll a society that might look like anything at all. Their 
very goallessness is in a sense the point·of these provisions. They capture our 
skeptical sense that we do not, in general, know where we arc going; we have 
no dominant overall collective project, and we want to keep it that way. The 
first Amendment, along with the other "civil liberties,"GO is there to maint:tin 
possibilities, to keep the future open to the presently unpredictable workings 
of the human imagination. Its eiTective enforcement requires a strong dose of 
skepticism - not (a self-contradictory) "absolute relativism," but a skeptical 
ollitudc toward collectively-imposed substantive moral judgments. (This skepticism 
is not inconsistent with a fair degree ofromanticism about the possible achievements 
of the unchecked human imagination.)''' By contrast, the civil-rights approach, 
on its more limited subject (the intolerability of a sntcm of group subordination 
or caste), is not skeptical at all - no more skeptical than were the abolitionists. 
(Of course, a degree of skepticism about the possibility of authoritatively ranking 
human beings, hence nf identifying "natural aristocrats," also lends . s~ppon to 
this limited egalitarian ;tbsolutism.) . 
In this ctmtr;~st between the dominant skeptic-ism of. the· civil libertarian and 
the tlomin:tnt confidence of the ciVil-rights advocate lies the best anl;wcr to the 
objection that a narrow prohibition of discrimin:ttory harassment violates "view­
point-neutrality" by discriminating in favor of the Left :tgainst the Right on 
issues relevant to civil-rights concerns. The answer is that if the prohibition 
has been framed narrowly enough, it docs preserve practical neutrality - that 
is, it does not difTercntially deprive any significant clement in American political 
life of its rhetorical c:~pit :ll. I would argue that' this is the case with the Stanford 
provision. The Right has no special stake in the free face-to-face usc of epithets 
c .. , •. 10? S. Ct. 706. 72 I (t'JWI). involh.btin~ a munidpal minoriry bu•inus sct·>Siuc ptllgtlm. the Co~n 
Njnri~)' :SIJtctl the ~trnunJs. fur rrc:~tlng cw:n hcnign uci}t cla~sificarion~ u suspcL·t in tcmu instrumcnral ro 3n 
anri·C>\tc goal : "Ciusificatiun_; l»><tl nn <>r< c>rry • danaer nf .cigm•tic hinn.... 1lrey m•r in f2c1 promute 
IIOiiont of nci•f inferinri•y and lc•d "' J politih nl' udal 1luostiliry." 
'"The l'in t Amrn~ntcnt I< '"" tied (as the free c•crcis., 2nd prii'Ol')' rights ue nut) ru the prcscrvlliCin of a 
fun('tionins t.fcrnucr21k S)liCm o( ~O\'C't-n•ncm; howcrcr. there coult.l conctinhly b( ll working fret spc:cch gu2untcc, 
Jo.ntificd •ton3 the lines I tug~cst. C\cn in • lihcral bu1 umlcmocmic sutc. 
"Thi, rom>nric •ide of the chil-lihrrtiu n1cnulicy i• vc,ry annctively presented in Stcl'en ShiiTrin, Tlrr Finr 
.(owJ,,I, DnnMTnry. Dnd Rnmnnu (C•n•LriJFc : I h r<>rJ lJni>crsicy Press, 19'10). 
I• 
.. 
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that perform no other function except to portray whole classes of Americans 
as suhhuman am) unworthy of ftill citizenship. 
v 
In conclusion, I must return to answer an objection .to the Stanford provision 
that I have heard from critics ofboth the civil-rights and civil-liberties persuasions. 
This has to do with the ch:uge that the regulation is drafted so narrowly as to 
make it "merely symholic," a point that evidently engages one of the key 
differences between the two approaches. I readily agree that the provision 
prohibits very little of the behavior that creates the significantly discriminatory 
hostile environment that faces students of color and others on many campuses. 
So why bother with it? The point is made with special force by civil libertarians, 
who think the proposal exacts a high cost in principle through its incursions 
into the indivisible fabric of the first amendment. But egalitarians, on their side, 
can also object on principle to the provision as a form of tokenism. 
I also concede that the main good the provision can do is through its educative 
or symbolic effect - though I would add that the harms its opponents see in 
it arc likewise largely symbolic as well. The question then arises: why can we 
not get the same educative effect through official statements, declarations of 
concern, and the like, issued witH'appropriate vehemence by university authorities 
whenever serious incidents of racist verbal abuse occUJr? Let me suggest a partial 
answer by modifying a hypothetical situation I posed earlier. 
Suppose a state legislature declared a "white supremacy day," perhaps invoking 
the descriptive and predictive terms of Justice Harl:m's dissent in Plmy v. 
Fcrtwon as :~n ideal. ("The white uce deems itself to be the dominant race in 
this country. And so it is.... So, 1 doubt not, it will continue for all time, if 
it remains true to its great heritage ....")"1 That would be a terrible thing, 
hut would it be unconstitutional? 1 think it would be - but 1 also admit there 
is at least some doubt as to the answer. On the other hand, there is no <loubt 
at all that state imposition of racial segregation in public facilities, even if they 
maintain perfect material <:quality, are unconstitutional. Yet by hypothesis the 
injury, the stigma of official racial insult, is the same in both cases - or, if 
anything, more explicit and obvious in the case of "white supremacy day." Why 
is segregation more obviously unconstitutional? 
One an!iwcr: hecause the government delivers tl1e insult with more force (and 
hence compounds the injury) when the action expressing the insult dots something, 
even if the thing done is (apart from the insult) not itself discriminatory. We 
think of g!Wcmmcnt as primarily an instrument for the maintenance of law and 
order and the provision of material public goods.63 Its ideological centrality in 
our lives derives mainly from its role as the primary repository of legitimated 
power in society. It provides such a "bully pulpit" largely bccauu it already ha5 
''lh.l l ".S. S.17. HV (IH9h). :\Ciu>l current CMirO\"crsicJ th>l nisc this issue (tlun•Jh less narkly) includt the 
runrinunJ unici.1l U\C h' ~uuthrm lUlU u( lhC' Cnnfc4.1tr.alc 0JJ. 
''Thi< im·t m•c nf ~m·cmmcnt in >II ,,,.. ictics: stt CliiTurd Gccrn, Nf1.•r•: 711, 711tolrr Sl•lt iM Ni•t1tt>t1A 
,,-,,.,., R•lo {Princrtnn: Prinrcton Cni,crsity Prcs.s. 1980). 
·~p 
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I so finn a grip on our attention ihmugh its coercive powers of taxation and bw enforcement. 
For this reason, government speaks most clearly when its message is delivered 
lhrough tl1e exercise of one of those powers, such as the provision of schools, 
parks, and tl1e like. We think of joint resolutions de!;ignating state flowers and 
mayoral proclamations of schoolteacher week as quite apart from the serious 
business of government. The adoption of a racist resolution or motto, then, 
!hough unconstirurional, would not be as obviously so as would, say, resegregating 
!he seats in the courthouse. When the government acts - when it does something 
- it puts its money where its mouth is. 
Similarly, when a university administration backs its anti-racist pronouncements 
wilh action, it puts its money where its mouth is. The action, if it is to serve 
this purpose, must be independently justifiable - independently, that is, of the 
symbolic purpose. Authorities make tl1e most effective statement when they are 
honestly concerned to do something beyond making a statement. And the action 
of punishing persons who violate the Stanford harassment regulation is justifiable 
independent of the statement it makes. It provides a r.emedy for an action that 
causes real pain and harm to real. individuals while .<:loing no good, and it may 
serve to deter such actions in the future. 
Notice that the idea of Lhe "main business of govemment" advanced here is 
derived from the classical liberal conception of the state, which in tum lies at 
!he heart of the civil-liberties approach: In that conception, government exists 
to prevent private force and fraud and to supply tangible public goods by taxing 
1nd spending. And tJ1at is basically all it is there for; its other functions arc 
either suspect or "merely symbolic." Yet throughout this essay I have contrasted 
that conception of government to one implicit in the civil-rights approach, which 
undermines t-raditional public-private distinctions as well :1s denying the automatic 
association of "merely" with "symbolic" or "intangible" when discussing of the 
kind of effects law and government should be centrally concerned with. 
And yet, at the end, I revert to slogans involving a distinction between real 
sl2te action and mere gesture! The point is that neither the civil~li.berties nor 
the civil-rights approach will go away; sometimes, a.s here, one of'them even 
feeds on the otl1er. With that suggestion of the sometimes paradoxical interweaving 
of these perspectives, incommensurably co-existing ·at the heart of modem 
liberalism, let me call a halt to this very !in)itcd examination of their mutual 
relations. 
Low, Stanford University 
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,_.,·PENDIXj TilE STANfORD DISCRIMINATORY 
HARASSMENT PROVISION 
PREAMBLE 
The Fundamental St~mdard requires that stude!rtts act with "such respect 
for ... the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens." Some incidents 
in recent years on campus have revealed doubt and disagreement about what 
this requirement means for students in the sensit.i•1e area where the right of 
free expression can conflict with the right to be free of invidious discrimination. 
The Student Conduct Legislative Council offers this interpretation to provide 
students and administrators with some guidance in this area. 
FUNDA.\tENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE EXPRESSION AND 
DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT 
I. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry and free expression. 
Students have the right to hold and vigorously defend and ·promote their 
opinions, thus entering them into the life of the University, there to flourish 
or wither according to their merits. Respect for this right requires that students 
tolerate even e>.'Pression of opinions which they find abhorrent Intimidation of 
students by other students in their exercise of this right, by violence or threat 
.. of violence, is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental Standard. 
2. Stanford is also committed to principles of equal opportunity and non­
discrimination. Each siUdent has the right of equal acce:;s to a Stanford education, 
without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual 
orienta tion , or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of students on the basis 
of any of these characteristics contributes to a hostile environment that makes 
access to education for those subjected to it less than equal. Such discrimi­
natory harassment is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental 
Standard. 
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended to clarify the 
point at which protected free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory 
h:~ras:;rncnt begins. Prohi~ired ·harassment includes dis.crirninatory intimidation 
hy threats of violence, and also includes personal vilification of students on tl1e 
basis of their sex, race, colo,r, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national 
and ethnic origin. 
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification 
if it : ' 
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of 
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handic~p. religion, sexual 
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and 
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or 
stigmatizes; and 
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words o~ non-verbal symbols. 
CIVIL RIGHTS VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES 107 
In the context of discriminatory harassment, insulting or "fighting" words or 
non-verbal symbols arc those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which arc commonly 
understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings 
on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or 
national and ethnic origin. 
_, 
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RACIAL HARASSMENT POLICY 

California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, is committed to 
creating and maintaining an environment in which the faculty, staff and 
students work together in an atmosphere of mutual respect and free 
academic interchange. In the University environment, all faculty, staff and 
students are entitled to be treated on the basis of their qualifications, 
competence and accomplishments without regard to race or ethnicity. 
Individuals are entitled to benefit from all University activities and 
programs as well as to conduct their daily affairs on campus without being 
discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnicity. · 
This policy seeks to prevent racial/ethnic harassment and provide prompt 
and equitable relief to the extent possible when such activity is observed 
and/or reported. While the University embraces the principles of free 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, it abhors the deliberate abuse of this freedom by those who 
would provoke hatred and/or violence based on race and ethnicity. 
Because racial harassment* creates an atmosphere of intimidation and 
hostility inconsistent with University goals, California Polytechnic State 
University, San Luis Obispo neither tolerates nor condones racial 
harassment towards any individual. Racial harassment is defined as: 
1. 	 oral, written, or physical acts conveying racial overtones; and/or 
2. 	 reprisals, threats of reprisal, or implied threats of reprisal following 
a racial harassment complaint. 
Examples of racial harassment include, but are not limited to: 
oral--derogatory or slanderous comments, jokes, epithets, 
or ethnic slurs, especially those making use of "fighting words;"** 
written--written derogatory or libelous comments, jokes, epithets 
or ethnic slurs, especially those making use of "fighting words;"** 
physical--physical violence and destruction of property, the 
display of racially offensive objects or pictures, cartoons or posters. 
Such behavior is especially egregious if it is repeated or if it constitutes a 
repetition of past similar behavior. 
-3-

Racial harassment violates University policy, and seriously undermines the 
academic and working environment. Program managers, Department 
Heads/Chairs and student leaders are responsible for taking appropriate 
steps to disseminate and support this policy statement. All faculty, staff, 
administrators and students will be h,eld accountable for compliance with 
this policy. 
* In the context of this policy, the tenn racial harassment also includes 
harassment based on ethnicity. 
* * Fighting words are those that are directed at an individual and are likely to cause 
the average person to retaliate and precipitate a breach of the peace. 
Subject: Unci: Productivity Discussio~4 -
\Ck: 
t:cA:! l<c.Job =:·li~Jqested that I ·fon·Jar-·d for yow- reviei•J the outline c•f 
productivity enhancement options that we developed for our initial" 
pr·eser,tation to the Chancellm-. Please note that this is effectively a 
.nenu from which policy choices could be made and not a firm statement of 
Ur,iveFsity plans. F'le.::~se give me a call if you hav·e any questions abOLit 
the attached. -·- Dan 
. , . · ~· .,•• , . ·~ ~•••, . IJ· ")• ~•••••, •• , . ·~ . , ••••• , • • ,. ·~ . , •• , • • , •• , ••, ••, •• , • • , • • , •• , •• , •• •• • ,. . ,. . , •• , •• , ••, ••, • • , •• • •• , •• , ......,. ••• • . •• • • • • • • • • . • . • • •• • • • 0 • • • • •• • 0 • • • 
DISCUSSION DRAFT DISCUSSION DRAFT DISCUSSION DRAFT 
{~c:.:1demic F't··oclucti-..,.ity Enhancements and Employee Incentives 
F'l'·od'..IC'i:. i vi ty Enl··,an<:ements 
Potential academic productivity gains should be conceived along two 
dimensions: 
~'. Tile potential to pt·oduce moF e SCU' s vJi th e:-: i sting i nst i tuti anal 
resources, through mare effective use of those resources. 
is': l'"he potential to produce mot-e SCU' s and mor·e successful! y cornpl eted 
SCU's through gains in student productivity. 
1. Using institutional resources in more innovative ways~ Cal Poly will 
explore ways of achieving: 
A. Increased FTES Per Fixed Costs 
1. By moving to true year-round operations, fully subscribing the 
s: u.;runet·· t t?t· ill. 
2. By utilizing distance learnina tecbnolcgy to serve a larger number 
of students Cbey~nd the physical l~mits of our present facil ities) 
~r1d / ot'"· to liiC:We efficiently utjli:ze faculty teaching in 101...,·-demC:Ind 
•.::OUt'"SES. 
B. Increased FTES:FTEF Ratio 
1. By utilizing instt-Lictional suppc•rt resoLn-ces- assi:.tants. 
instructional technology - to enable faculty to manage the ins~ructi on 
of a larger number of students. 
-5-

JI. Cc;..l r-·c.·ly !•Jill e:d=:.o e:·:plo,-e I•Jays o ·f attaining gains in ~· tL\dent 
pr-oduct i vi t.y. 
Pd·.. present. : .tudefit pr-oduc:ti vi ty gai r.s are nclt I" e\<Jarded by the CSU 
·stem's funding formulas. To the extent that we shift our focus to 
::::.·tudent f:H-oductivity, \•ie may I•Jish to ::.eek shifts in the funding/re\~a,-d 
structure away from FTES counts to student outcome measures. 
i::C.rnong the poter.tial prodLtctivity enh2.ncements Cal Poly 1-1ill e:-;plw-e: 
1. Initiatives - for example, in the area of financial aid - that 
p~r mit/encourage students to attempt more SCU's on average. 
2. More intrusive advisement, utilizing technology to establish student 
p 1 a1 ·1s of stLtdy and moni tot- student pt-ogress to degt-ee. 
3. Expanded use of instructional technology - and/or other instructional 
s.uppot-t nH?t.hods- to increa:.e student pass ,~ates in academic cc.•Ln--ses. 
4. Expanded access by students to information resources, through use of 
t:t"'·t:hrlol ogy. 
Employee Relations and Incentives 
Consi st.c:·nt vJi th the:! need to ef fec:t pi·-oduct i vi ty enhancements for- the 
efficient accommodation of added enrollment, the University is s 
ensitive to the need for strong relations with employee groups and the 
creationof appropriate incentives to reward efforts of facult y and 
staff . 
.feat:Lwe o ·f the e>:plot-ation of the chat-ter campus conc.:ept included the 
creation of an Employee Relations Committee. This committee w as the 
t- e~ult of meet and confer sessions vJith t-epresentation of all 
bargainingunits and has the endorsem~nt of the CSU and of the s tatewide 
bargaining units (Units 6 and 8 serve in an observer capacity by 
theirchoice). 
* The committee~ through the exploration of specific issues~ is 

attempting to define parameters and guidelines that would lead to a 

poter,tial -ft-·arne\o'Jc.t-k for th~ cl-e<:~tion CJf campus-specific sidebar­
':':t.ql'.. t::E·mel ·lts. 
;t. It. is envisioned that this type of mechanism ~·1auld ·facilitate a 
linkage between productivity and incentives not currently recogniz ed or 
possible. 
~3t;tch i nc:enti ves COLil d be! i ndi vi dual or· gt-oup, monetat-y or nc.in-··monet.:(ry. 
Clearly~ optimization of the deployment of our human resource s toward 
,;o.c:h i evi ng ent-oll r11ent objectives can best be accomp 1 i shed tht- ough the 
overt linkage of productivity with incentives. 
t,Je hope to develop mc•dels t.liat c.:<:~n be ,-eplicated else\·Jhet-e in the CSU 
Syste:T1. 
·-·s·r•efits to Studel,ts 
I r. l he event that the cost o -f enr-·oll ment gr·o\<Jth is I·Jholl y funded tht-ough 
i11creased revenues, which may come from increased appropriat ions and/or 
:l nc1· eased ·fees, the question ~·Ji 11 at- i se c•f 1-1hat benefits fo1~ student:. 
-6­
dt• e ciS~. c.c.:i ated 1-Ji th the hi ghet- cos:.t. The best ans:.w et- ~·Ji 11 be deri \.•ed 
!.: ht-·ouqh a d).alogue ~>"Jith paying stakehaldet'"S by asking them ~·Jhat they 
l·.•c•uld like ·fur tho::e additional e:·:penditure·s. 
r plan presents a list of potential benefits to be created~ following 
'"~· dialc:•gue ~-Jith stakehold10r·s: 
..I. Increased personal attention 
,'::·~. Pet-s.oroal i zed .:;,dvi sing and easi 1 y access.i bl e neb·JC•r ked advi si 111~ 
in f cwm<:~t i eon 
B. Automated transcript evaluation 
C. Guat··anteed access to clas.ses "j\.\St in time" t<.l meet theit- pt-ofJi~am of 
study demands. 
D. Full screen information while registering 
1. course availability 
2. schedule information 
E:.. "One stop :.hop" for University imposed contacts 
1. ·Fee payment 
2. housin1:;} and othet·· aLixili.:lt-y fees 
3. financial aid 
• 	 i:::·l.t:.·.:\(:1-y C.H i11q:.H uveJ ir ... c.lc:-\SS attetd.ic.H1 
1. same or smaller class sizes 
2. increased class sizes accompanied by offsetting opportunities for 
personal attention: 
a. cout·- ·::.e ~·.•at-e 
b. increased student assistants 
c. tutorials available through information t~chnology over the network 
II. Improved access to services 
A. Library access 
1. real time~ i.e. hours doors are open 
2. virtual access 
D. Dthet-· ins:.tt·uc:tional ser·v ic:es 
l. email 

:::. dt:ita bases 

3. software tools 
4. multimedia courseware 
C. 	 Administrative information 
i.. schedule 
2. gra.des 

3 .. : .tatLtS 

4. pet-scmal information 
0. i-Ii gher 1 evel s of student/academic suppc•rt services 
1. tutorial services 
2. psychological services 
3. student life and activities 
4. ccu~eer and placement set·- vices 
5. assessment and testing services 
6. special support programs (Minority Engineering~ Student Academic 
Services~ Multicultural Programs and Services, Women's Programs and 
Services) 
; Free Speech Returns to Stanford 

111 Law: Court ranks the First 
Amendment ahead of 'hurt 
feelings' in nullifying a code that 
was a model for many campuses. 
By NAT HENTOFF 
In 1990, Stanford University enacted a 
speech code that prohibited :·person~! 
vilification of students on the bas1s of their 
sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sex'Ual 
orientation, or national and ethnic origin." 
Its core was the largely unused "fighting 
words" exception to the First -"'-mendment 
in the 1942 Supreme Court's Chaplinsky 
decision. 
Preceding the code was a vigorous 
two-year debate on campus. \Vhat particu­
larly startled me then was a letter in the 
Stanford Daily urgently advocating an 
even harsher speech code than th~ admin­
istration's. The Jetter was signed by the 
African American Law Students Assn., the 
Asian American Law Students Assn. and 
the Jewish Law Students Assn. 
· The most distinguished opponent of the 
) speech code on campus was Jaw professor 
Gerald Gunther, arguably the preeminent 
constitutional scholar in the country. Gun­
ther had received his elementary school 
education in Germany, and during the 
Stanford debate, he noted that as a child, 
his teacher, fellow students and the towns­
people. would address him as l1tdensau­
Jewishpig. 
But, he said, he learned long ago that the 
way to deal with vicious speech is "with 
more speech, with better speech, with 
repudiation and contempt." 
Gunther, however, lost the battle over 
what he called "this hideous precedent" of 
a speech code. 
For years, Stanford had prized itself for 
adhering to First Amendment standards of 
free speech even though it is a private 
university. 
Involuntarily-as of February-Stan­
ford is back on a First Amendment stand­
ard because of a suit brought by a Jaw 
school alumnus, 27-year-old Robert Corry, 
and eight other alumni and students still at 
Stanford. They claimed that the speech 
code obstructed "the development of a 
healthy atmosphere of free and open 
discussion on campus." 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
Judge Peter Stone declared the Stanford 
code unconstitutional because it was "ov­
erbroad," thereby punishing speech that 
goes beyond "fighting words." After all, 
Stone ruled, "Stanford cannot proscribe 
speech that hurts the feelings of those who 
hear it." The university, having targeted 
'Tribalism and tensions have 
increased despite speech 
codes. . . . "If you're fearful 
that somehow you will 
misspeak, you wind up 
avoiding the very people you 
need to get to know."' 
"the content of certain speech," violated 
the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 
But how does the First Amendment 
apply to a private university"? It does in 
California because of the 1992 "Leonard 
law": Private educational institutions may 
not discipline any student "solely on the 
basis of ... speech or other communica­
tion that when engaged in outside the 
campus is protected from government 
restriction by the First Amendment." 
Stanford's defeat is likely to affect · 
private and public colleges in other states. 
Indeed, Sheldon Steinbach, general coun­
sel for the American Council on Educa­
tion-representing 1,700 colleges and uni­
versities-told the San Francisco Chrolii­
cle: "This is the final nail in the coffin :oi 
speech codes." 
Court rulings aside, the codes have not 
worked. Tribalism and tensions have in­
creased despite speech codes. Actually, :in 
part because of them. As Steinbach says. 
. '' if you're feariul that somehow you \olill 
misspeak, you wind up avoiding the very 
people you need to get to know." · : 
The president of Stanford, Gerhard Cas­
per. has decided that the university: \~ill 
not appeal Stone's decision. Y.et the Stan­
ford code had been regarded by otJier 
colleges as the best drawn of all codes. 
Exultantly, Paul McMasters of the Fre:e­
dom Forum First Amendment Center -at 
Vanderbilt University declared: "The qig 
tree in the forest of speech codes has 
fallen." 
Although there is no "Leonard la\v"' ·in 
other states, Stone gave encouragement to 
.students at private universities around the 
country. He approvingly cited the plain­
tiffs' argument that states' civil rights, 
se;mal harassment and wqrkplace -protec­
tion measures already affect private insti­
tutions and individuals because-like ' the 
Leonard Jaw- they are "important to the 
interes.ls of the people of the state" and so 
are a "constitutional exercise of the broad 
police powers of the state." 
Tom Grey, the Stanford law professor 
who designed the speech code, wantea to 
appeal the court decision. He insists 
that the code has worked because nobody 
was brought up on charges in thE .41h 
years or its existence. A student responds, 
"That indicates one hell of a chilling 
efiect." 
Stanford's president now moui'ns 
the imposition of First Amendment stand­
ards on "the fragile private sphere." st:an­
ford is hardly that fragile. Nor are· its 
students. 
Nat Hentoff is an authority on the ·First 
Amendment and the rest of the BiU of Rl.ghts. 
t1hJ (___ "-':~ Jf.NNIFER RODACK 
t\11 the ethnic groups in Amcr.ican life must agree to give up the political 
strug-gle to control the federal government. All of them must come to believe 
that they would be better off with race-neutral law, even if they might otherwise 
win some rounds of political struggle for governmental favor. I believe that the 
negative-sum game of ethnic politics can only be stopped by both a broad level 
of popubrly supported constitutional prohibitions against it, and certain insti­
tutional constraints on the political process. 
\ _,,_ 
::: Famomia, Gmrxc ,Hason Unircrsity 
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CIVIL RIGHTS VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE CASE OF 
DISCRIMINATORY VERBAL HARASSMENT• 
lh TtiOMAS c. GREY 
The expression of a change of aspect is tl1e expression of a n{W 
perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged . 
Wittgcnstein, Philosophical /nV(stigatiom 1 
American liberals believe that both civil liberties and civil rights arc harmonious 
aspects of a basic commitment to human rights. Uut recently these two clusters 
of values have seemed increasingly to conflict- as, for example, with the femini st 
claim that the legal tole ration of pornography, long a goal sought by civil 
libertarians, actually violntes civil rights as a fonn of sex discrimina~ion. 
Here I propose an interpre ta tion of the conflict of civil rights and civil liberties 
in its latest manifestation: the controversy over how to treat discriminatory verbal 
harassment on American campuses. I was involved with the controversy in a 
practical way at Stanford, where I helped draft a harassment regulation that 
was recently adopted by the university. 
Like tl1e pomography issue, the harassment problem illustrates· the clement 
of paradox in the conOict of civil-liberties and civil-rights perspectives or 
mentalities. This problem docs not simply trigger familiar disagreements between 
liberals of a classical or libertarian orientation as against those of a welfare state 
or social democratic one - though it docs sometimes do that. In my experience, 
the issue also has the power to appear to a single person in di(Terent shapes 
and suggest different solutions as it oscillates between being framed in . civil~ . 
liberties and in civil-rights . ~enns. At the same time, however, it remains 
recognizably the same problem. It is th11s a very practical and political example 
of the kind of tension noted by Wiugcnstein in the aphorism that heads this 
essay - a puzzle of interpretive framing, of "seeing-as." 
One of my aims in this essay is to bring the reader to share the s·ense of 
paradox tl1at, for me, pervades the expcri enc~ of trying to categorize and resolve 
the harassment issue . At the outset, let me sketch what I take to be the two 
main structural features of the clash between the civil-liberties and the civil­
rights perspectives that this problem exemplifies. 
'My lhanu for ucd!enl rcseuch usisr>ncc go lo William IJoyle, Jay Fowler, •nd John Tweedy. And I •m 
aho rnrcfut for !he cdi1orial suggcuions of 1Jarbu11 B>bcod, B>rbn• Fried, Muir. Kclm>n. Richud Posner, 
Rob<n R>bin. Cuol Rose, jHr<s Weinucln, Sleven ShiiTrin, 2nd Sreven Winrer: of rhose who >ncndcd my 
flruhy woruhop >I llo>h I loll, Univershy of Califomi>, Derkclcy; and of Ellen P>ul ond rhc or her cdiror< of 
S.CW PAit.rbphy (5 Poliry. Fln>lly, special rluou, for lnsplntion, 10 Charles Lawrence Ill. 
1Ludwig Wingcnslcin, PhiloropAir.al brvmix.ari""r 19~ (Nrw York: Macmilbn, 195R). 
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HZ TttOMAS C. GREY 
First, the I\' .tpproach~s take contrasting views of intangible or psychic injury. 
The civil-lihcrtic:s mentality, centrally concerned with protecting freedom of 
e~-prcssion :~gaimt censorsh ip, tends 10 limit 1hc kinds of harms that can justify 
:~bridgment of th:n freedom to traditionally recogni1.ed infringements of tangible 
interests in property anu bodily security. In particular, claims that government 
on interfere wilh speech lo protecl sensibilities, emotional tranquillity, or self­
esteem - in general, Jaliugs - are strongly disfavored. h is a "bedrock principle" 
of ci\·il liberties that censorship is not justified to prevent even what is "deeply 
oiTensivc to many."l The civil-libertarian counsel to fellow citizens is the 
tr:tdition:tl parental advice to the child wounded by insult or rejection: "Sticks 
:tnt! !\tOnes m:1y break my bones, but words will never hurt me" - not hurt 
c71'111K.h. that is, to justify the known costs of censorship. 
lly cnntrasl, the civil-righls :tpproach, with its roors in anti-discrimination law 

:~ nd );ocial policy, is centrally cnncemed with injuries of stigma and humiliation 

to thw;c who arc the ,·ictims of discrimin:llion - conduct generating "feelings 

of inferiority" that d:~m3ge "hearts and minds," in the langttage of the most 

f:~mou s American civil rights case.l The point is not so much to protect a sphere 

of :nHonomy or personal security from intmsion as to protect potentially marginal 

mcmhcrs of the comm11nity from admio11 - from relegation, that is, to the 

~ t :t tu s of second-class citi7.cns. 
The second contrast is a relate4. one: it comes in the treatment of the public­
pri\":tte tli!\tinction. The active state is traditionally · conceived as rhe sole or 
tlnmin:ult threat w ci,•il liberties ." Civil libertarians do not spend much of tl1cir 
timl' or ~ncrgy seeking ways to positively empower dissenters, deviants, and 
IIOIH:nnl"ormists against the pressures broughr on them by unorganized public 
opinion. r1r by private employers or landlords. The catalogue of civil liberties 
is rc nainl~· what Judgc Richard Posner has called the Constitution: "a charter 
of nq~:lli\"C r:11her than positive liberties. "i 
"But lw continue with the same quotation from Judge Posner) where. the 
liberty :~ss c rted is the rit;ht to equal treatment irresr.~ctive of race or sex, the 
:tnalysis i$ more complex."S Under the civil-rights perspective, defense of basic 
human rights is by no mc:tns simply a matter of limiting slate power. Government 
may tleny equal protection by omission as well as by action - for example, by 
n·fu sint: 1:1\ \ " enforcement protection to minorities. The tendency of the civil ­
rif.(hts mcn taliry is to f:l\·nr the prohibition of all invidious treatment that has 
cht· c.:ff"cct nf ~ implying inferiority in civil society" to individuals on the basis of 
tl ~~: ir membership in it.l entifinblc social groups.6 This "anti-discrimination prin­
r ipk~ goes hey<lnd cle:!llsing government action of bias; it nlso attacks 
d i~niminati()n on the suspect bases of race, sex, and so on, in the other major 
institutions of ci\il society. Thus the identification of a new form of invidious 
'l '•H.-d .\'tJtn t. f:,,.~m"" · I 10 S. Ct. l~IH, HIO (1990). 

' HmJNt t HtoJrJ "/ l."JuMi•n. ]~] U.S. ~RJ, -194 (1954). 

• llohrn ,.. Orr nf fall Oira.(ll. 79'1 F.2J 1180, 1189-'JO {7th Cir., 19RM (concurring opininn). 
·t~.J 
''-""""J", llr<t li~"'"· IOU L".S. (10 Ono) J~J. J08 (IRRO). 
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discrimination today typically brings with it pressure for legislation against private 

as well as official discrimination of that kind in housing, employment, and 

education.7 

When the conflict of civil-lihcnies and civil-rights perspectives is described 

in terms of the structural features just sketched, it resonates with a number of 

lhe binary oppositions of social philosophy; liberty against equality; liberty ~gainst 

democracy; individualism against collectivism; the methods of economics and 

r.ttional choice theory against those of sociology and culrur:1l anthropology. 

Though I hope what I have to say here may intrigue those interested in the 

practical implications of the standard theoretical dichotomies, I do not analyze 

the harassment issue in these terms. . 

This is partly to avoid one of the teJ:Tiplations of classic social philosophy, 

lhe urge to make it as nearly as possible like geometry or physics. One seeks, 

using this paradigm, to formulate contending theoretical positions as models, 

su1ed as broadly and at the same time as rigorously as possible. Adopting this 

approach, one then sees an actual controversy that brings these oppositions into 

play as simply a manifestation of underlying theoretical contradictions. The 
 ~ practical issue serves the purpose of forcing choice !between the theories, just 

u crucia.l experiments are supposed to force choice between rival scientific 

hypotheses. On the harassment issue, the structural conClict benveen civil­
 ~ liberties and civil-rights approaches then naturally appears as the vivid illustration 

of a contradiction between, for example, opposed libertarian and egalitarian 
 ~ theories of liberalism. Intellectual rigor and respect f(lr consistency would then 

require forthright resolution of the contradiction, most readily achieved by 

..rejecting one of the conOicring · alternatives. 
This seems 10 me rhe wrong w:~y to deal with the harassment problem; >I' 
indeed, it generally seems the . wrong w:~y to deal wirh most theoretical 
disagreements as they bear on social, political, and legal questions. Rarely can ~ 
important theories in these areas be plausibly formulated as models or axiom­
systems precise enough to give rise to "contradictions:." Much more often the I. 
2ctual working theories arc perspectives, approaches, or mentalities constituted " 
of more or less vague (but never completely open-ended) clusrers of goals, I 
ideals, guidelines, :~nd presumptions. When theories this imprecise clash, !10 
principle of logic requires rejection of either one. . . ):· Methods of social philosophy -that seek to forml(latc: lheorics with maximum 
precision do so with an eye to determinacy - they seek theories that can actually 
rompd results where they apply. Theories that conflict over a practical issue 
then compel conflicting results; when a contradicrion arises, one theory must 
be chosen to the exclusion of the other. Yet in problcrnaric practical situations, 
each of the conflicting theories (perspectives, approaches, mentalities) may have 
something valuable and ev<:n essential to contribute to a resolution. In such 
situations, oversharpened theories tend to produce incomplete and one-sided 
'S« Paul Brut, "Fnrcword: In Dcfcmc nf the Antidiscrimin>lion l'rinciplc," 1/an•orJ La"' Rroirw. vol. 90 
(t976), p. I. 
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outcomes, whereas a pragmatistiOierance of theoretical ambiguity and imprecision 
can conduce to better results. 
Such a situation is, it seems 10 me, presented by the issue of discriminatory 
harassment. This problem exemplifies something liberal pragmatists should accept 
as normal :_ a conflict between plural, sometimes incommensurable, structured 
clu~tcrs of values :uHJ principles, here the familiar ones surrounding the tcnns 
~ci\· il liberties" and "civil rights." Where these conflicting approaches overlap, 
as the)' inevitably will, lihcral democrats can identify a range of mediating 
:1 !:olutions \nat rc!>pect the claims of hoth conllicting approaches. I niTer the StanforJ provision on Jiscrimioalill')' \'crh:'ll harassment as an example of such 
a solution. But first I should more fully describe the practical issue and the ) opposctl civil-rights and civil-liberties approaches to it. 
;I 
., 
Thcre has recently been an upsurge in the number and intensity of reported 

incidcnts of racist, homophobic, and sexist abuse in Americ:m universitics.8 An 

J extreme example ,~·:a.s the incident reported at the University of Wisconsin in 

II wh ich white students f'ollowcd a black woman student across campus shouting 

w\\'c ',·c nc\·cr tried a nigger."~ Perhaps less ~~equivocal in its implications was
'J tH is exchange at Stanford: after :1 dormiitory argument in which a black student 
) had cl:timcd that Lud\\'ig 1•an Dcethoven was a mulatto and other students had 
~ objected 10 placing such stress on racb.l origins, two white studen.ts defaced a
,, 
pic.:turc of the composer into a blackface caricature and posted it nc:ar the black:>
.. student's room.1'1 
",, The question is : what disciplinary action (if any) is appropriate in such cases? 
,\ pure ~i,·il-rights approach treats the conduct in C]UCstion as discriminatory
;I h;Hassment. Then principles of equ:al treatment not only entitle hut rcquir( 
. ~ uni1·ersitie~ to punish the bcharior, at le:ast if it becomes suOicicntly widespread
. to crcate a pcr\'Jsi\'cly hostile environment. The :1nalogy is to employers' 
'I obligations to tical with racial or sexual harassment hy fellow employees in the 
•' ;) 	 workplace. \Vhcn black or female employees must endure :1 barr:tgc of r:ace­
or scx-hasetl insults from co-workers, an employer who ignores the situation 
" 
, I 
• I "' ill .. t.,•n nulc 1l•c uH•r.. in•r1it)·intt :~~~o.~umr,iun 1h .11 :all the~~ fomu. of di~crimin:ation c~n :.nd should ~ 
UCJh'tf ahc 'Jn1c, t:.Sch (urm n( in~uh h:as i1s. t'I'IA1\ vniquc features and prohlcmJ, hown-tr, and may ultimacdy 
~C'f'lnlh' it< n""n tli~tiOCl 1\t"kly u( legal dtM!'Irinc, u due ~ (ach fom1 o( tliKrimination rtcognlt.etl ~s "'inv\diout• 
UrHirr t'tjU..II rrc)IC(lilln '""' iJn..S ci'il ri~hu. $1.11'\llt~ . I v..m, mnrcfWC'r, ru• diurimin.ation ag:~insr pys :uld lt5hlarU 
in • 'i•h the rcsc, lh<IUlth h tns IIIII )'tt Lu·n rrcugnb:ttl a!t in,•idin\1\ urnlcr rcdcu1 constinuiunal l:.w. A num~r 
o( -.utc- 1n"l l• ,.:1l d'il •i,:lti'C b"''· 1nJ tht 1nd-di.\Crimin::aciun pulic-iu of many puhlic and priv21e instirutioru: 
tind\ulin tt ~unft~rd) J,. rn•hihh SC'\'U.II·rrcfttcnc:c db.crimhu11inn, l j; In my \'itw :~II should. 
• 7;.,,, .\b) B. I'JHQ, p. H'J. 
tnt"'-) \ h (ulry cu-duir uf lh( \'lmpu~ iUt1{cbl council :Jt Sranrurd u.hcn thi5 incident occurred~ nu disciplin&ry 
~ h..trJ:''' ... rrc 11hinutd~ hruutttu. Thcrc:~ticr I wcukul f'n tht draftin1 uf a disdplinuy stanc.hrc..l ttl deal whh r&· 
d•l " "'"mcnt, "hieh "H "'"r'<d ky the ompu~ lcci<bti,·e hody •ml hccame dTectivc in june of 19q0. The llee­
lh"'< n in,•iol<nl ;, trutul cl•"tu,·nll!', >lrietly frnm • ci,il·ri~hts pcrspccth·c, in Patricia \\'illi•m•, "The Ohliginc Shell: 
An lntumul ~:'"!' nn Fnnml F.•J•ul Opp<•nuniry," .ll id•it•• /,a,.. Rrdrrzo, mi. 87 (1989), pp. 2128, 2133-37. 
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may be guilty of unlawful (and if a public employer, unconstitutional) race or 
sex discrimination.'' Again I quote Judge Posner, certainly no civil-rights 
extremist: 
By taking no steps to prcvcnl: sexual harassment, the: ciry crcatetl :1 
worse working environment for women than for men ... That is 
discrimination ... It is as if the city Jecided to provitlc rcstrooms for 
male but not female employees, and when pressed for a 'reason said it 
simply didn't care whether its female employees were comfortable or 
not.12 
In the case in question, the sexual harassment included some physical contact 
and coercive sexual proposals by supervisors, as well as sexist obscenities and 
epithets from fell ow workers . In discriminatory h:ar:~ssment cases, however, courts 
luve not sharply differentiated between action and verbal abuse in evaluati ng 
claims by black or female employees. Typically, action and speech arc blended 
together in a course of conduct that gives fisc to liability for the employe r when 
it creates an intolerably "hostile environment" for women or racial minori ty 
employees. In some cases, which the courts h:tve nnt singled out for spcci:ll 
treatment on this ground, harassment is found from speech alone - typic:~lly :1 
&\ream of racist or sexist jokes, pictures, and epithets. To :~void liabilil)·, the 
employer must take re:~sonablc steps to keep verbal as well as physic:al or 
otJte.rwise coercive abuse below the level of :1 "sustained pattern of hJrassment. "IJ 
The decisive question is not whether the h:arassmcnt constitutes speech or 
action, but whether it is widcsprc:ad and serious enough to go beyond wh:~t the 
courts judge must be tolerated :IS pan of life's onJinary rough and tumbl_e. 
A civil rights approach to the. verbal abuse problem on campus simply ~pplies 

the doctrine of hostile c'nvironment discrimination to the university. Most 

"The applic>ble leg>l pro•i• lons ore (fur most private emrlny<r<) Titl< VII of the Civil Right> Act of 1%~. 
-Nch ptohibla tmp1oycf.1 frr~m dilcrin\inuintt ;ag:ainu c_tnp1o}-'ccs on the buis of race or SC'X in the •tcnns or 
conditions of employment." and (for puhlk cmployu~) rhc Founetnth Amendment's rcquircmenl 1h11 no <l>t< ... 
NJ "d.ny co any J><rson the cqu>l protection of the hws." which h>s been constmcd to pruhihir r>C< >nJ sex 
diu-riminsiion In public employment, ' 
11 6.Am u. £411 C~ico,o, p. 1191. Judg< Po<ntr ahem>tivcly •n•lyz<J 1hc emrloycr's in•<~i"n , •n•logous to 

t O<lcttivc withJ~1ul of rrotcction, U ((a government odtnicd police protection IO hl1ch, or f1ileJ IO puni'h 

f'IPC:I a.lone: amons viofc:m crimes. 
11 ln "'' dis<'rimin>t:ion cues under Title VII, the coum dittinlf\Jhh between ·~uiJ pro quo· h>nssmcnt (cffnn< 

'> ennct sci\UI (avon in rerum for jab rcrention or promotion) •nd "hn.uile en.;rnnment" h>r:usmcnt o( the 

kind dC'SCribcd in the 1«1. R>ci>l b>nJsmcnl 1>\tt only the bner form , The Supreme C:nun rccogniud hotlilc 

arrlrcnmcnl scnul h>rlumenl •s a Title VII viobrion in Mmlor St11•inp Bon! 1•, l'in1on, -477 U.S. 57 (198~). 

On hostile en.;rohment d l...:rin~ination, sec R•t"' •·· F.f.OC, 454 f' .2d 231, 2JR (Sth Cir. 1?71) ("sust><ned p>llcm 

oCiwusmenl"); BunJ:y v. }G<Ioon, 6H F.ld 9H (D. C. Gr. 1?81), >nd lfr-~ron u. CifJ ofV.,nJu, 682 F.2d R?7 

(l hh Clr. 1982) (su:u•l h>rusment cues invohin5 mind quiJ pro '"" •nd pure >crb>l huusment inciJcnt•); 

Em.'. o. CA'1fkr Pl4ltio, 722 F.2d 1250 (6th Gr. 198Sl; EEOC, ., MuryA,r Motor frtixJ.t Unt1, 4R8 V. Supr 

lSI (0. Minn. t980) (eOlployu f•ilurc to ukc sction >Jf' insl nci<t lnsuht of b!2 c~ emp!nycc hy rdtnw worhn 

l>cld unlawful di...:rimin>lion). 	 · 
\ 

H6 TIIOMAS C. GREY 
I 
eclucawrs, like most employers, arc required by law (as they should feel required 
hy fairness) to provide equal opportunity to women and students of color. 
C:tmpus harassment can make rne educational environment hostile, just as 
workrlacc harassment makes the employment environment so. Many campuses 
have already recogni1.ed this with respect to sexual harassment and have adopted 
disciplinary restrictions accordingly. There is no good reason why racial or anti­
homosexual harassment should not be treated in the same way. As a legal 
maner, an unremedied "sustained pattern of harassment" might make rnc 
university itself guilt)' of unlawful discrimination. 14 Pmdent and sensitive admin­
istrators will prohibit acts of harassment before the point at which the conduct 
cumulates into a sustained pattern and thus creates a legally actionable hostile 
environment. 
An analysis like this can easi ly lead to a prohibition defined purely in terms 

of civil rights. Thus the University of Michigan, faced with an upsurge in racial 

hJrassmcnt, enacted a prohibition against any "behavior, verbal or physical" thAt 

"stigmatizes or victimizes" an individual on the basis of race, sex, or other 

characteristics protected under the university's non-discrimination policy and 

that has the "reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's 

academic efforts," or "lclrcates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment 

ror educational pursuits." This is a prohibition drafted to track the form of 

injury dealt with by the civil-rights. approach - conduct contributing to a hostile 

environment that denies equal educational opportunity. 1S 

And yet, in" the first major case involving the regulation of campus verbal 

harassment, a federal district court struck this provision down on First Amendment 

grounds. 11• Civil libertarians applauded the opinion; they qualified their applause 

at the rc"Sult only because the case seemed so easy that it did not establish a 

·:;particularly powerful precedent for other cases of regulation ofcampus harassment. ~· 
1\nd an c:~sy case it was - as soon as it was considered from the angle of a 

civil-liberties, rather than a civil-rights, approach. 

Viewed through a First Amendment lens, the Michigan regulation - now 

seen :ts a "hate speech" or "group defamation" rule rather than a harassment 

prohibition - was :t dramatically overbroad incursion into core areas of protected 

speech. Comider just one example of the kind of speech prohibited by the 

regulation, taken from the guidelines the university distributed to student to 

cxpl:ii n the new policy: 

\'A> ,.;,It public cmploycn, ohc Fuunccntll "Amendment p1ohibiu public uni¥cnitics from di<erimlnatinJ OCI 

Ill< ,,,;, n( n ee or sex in pt<niding cducsrion>t ~niccs . Privstc uni>cnitiu rcccivins fcdcnl gr:anu arc sublca 

10 •imihr rrc>hibirioou untlcr Tille IX o( 1hc Civil Ri~hls Act o( 19M. In some st~tcs, •IJIUI<> dso proklbll 

oliscrimio>tory pr>eticcs 1>y printc unh·crsitie>. finslly. moSI priulc univenitics in !he United St.stcs have commhtrd 

1hemsck<1 10 nnn·discriminstion policics. o;.hicli m>y give ris.c to contr:octusl Usbili!y when • student un .how 

d is<riminui~n thst Ylnuld be unlsw(ut for • public university. 

"lntlccd i1 "" n idcnrl)' dr.o(tcd on !he model o( the Equ2l Emptll)•lntnt Opportunity Commiuion JUioleUna, 
.. hich oldint S<~usl hsrusmenl 10 include -._rbsl or physics! conduct o( s suus! n•rurc" lhst "hu the purr-e 
nr <ITccl o( unrea,.,.nsbly intCI'(cring v.ioh >n indnidu>l"s work pcrfonn•ncc or crcstin« sn lnlimidstin&, hOttik. 
' " uffcMh·c ,.·nrking cn,·irnnmcnt." 29 CFR ! 1604. 11 (>). 
''Dw r·. l"nirmiry nf.\lirhit••. 711 F. Supp. 852 (E. D . l>lich. l989). Sec 856 (or !he text o( the regulation&. 
•  
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A male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as good 
in this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for 
female classmatesY 
From this one can rcatlily extrapolate to other statements (made in class or in 
a donn hallway debate) that would .violate the standard: arguing on the basis 
or IQ data that blacks arc less intelligent tltan whites; mat homosexuality is 
"unnatural," or is a disease; that women arc naturally l<:ss creative £han men. 18 
The expression of tJtese opinions is certainly experienced as "stigmatizing" and 
wdemeaning" by many, probably most, students belonging to the groups thus 
insuhcd; when cumulated to create a climate of opinion, comments like these 
might well foresccably "interfere with the academic efforts" of the students If 
whose basic humanity or equal mental capacity tl1ey deny. 
Because the Michigan regulation has been so univet·sally condemned, it is 
important to understand how campus authorities might ha'le draficd and enforced 
it the way they did . They evidently viewed the problem of verbal harassment 
from one perspective only: the perspective of civil rights. Viewed solely through 
I'the lens provided hy anti -discrimination law anti policy, the kind or statements 
to which d1e regulation was applied"might well appear as more polite but no •' 
less demeaning versions of ilie kind of racist, sexist, or homophobic insults I~routinely prohibited unc.Jcr anti-harassment codes in t11e employment area. 
I . 
Indeed, the very "politeness" of these st!ltcments might rationally be thought 
to make tltcm mor( disabling to the educational performance of those exposed ,~ . ,.
to them than are the relatively rare incidents involving gutter epithets. At most 
,.universities, the victims of the crudest insults can partly discount them because 
i~they clearly transgress the dominant mores. By contrast, the more academically 
rtspcctablc forms of denigration of blacks, women, and gays can be supportetl ,,by evidence anc.J argttment, the forms of discourse with maximum credibility in 
," 
the university. And the damage such statements do is probably enhanced when 
the stereotypes they reinforce deny Lhe ability of groups of students to study II 
and learn whose members already feel marginal on many campuses. The discourse i b 
of "statistics show ..." ;md "environmental factors cannot fully c~p.Jain .. ." II 
may much more effectively create a hostile education:tl environment than "[Epithet] ,, 
go home!" · 
l.lut as soon as a civil-liberties· perspective is brought to bear, the kind of 1r' 
speech reached by the Michigan regulation is"readily seen as close to the core 
of the First Amendment. The record in the federal court challenge to the 
regulation, witl1 a large number of complaints processed, and many resolved 
11 
VOt v. .llitAito•. p. 8S8. The tiuiJr 14"COI on Ill \I'Jm stuucnl~ IIIli -rou src ' '"""Cr "hen ... You 
tommen l in s drro~21ory ,...). >luou1 • • • . pnup"s • • . cuhunl nrii(ins, nr rdi~inus hdicfs- - s very '"'<<pin~ 
Infliction on 1hc Jiscltl~inn of hhlnry· >nd current c.-cnu. I> liy.h1 nnt ~tr«nin~ 7J..r l.a,r Trmprarinn nf Chn'u or 
•d11lin1 1lr S111unir J'mn c:oun1 :~ s "\J('wg;atul')' commcn!'.. nn ::. •!(rttup's rdi~uu~ bdic:(~·? 
Under 1t1t Unhcn.ily n( f\1ichi,fPU fCJ(Ub.tion, 21 soci:al " 'ork l.lUd(nl w.a..c. in f:1 c1 prn!'iccutcU for cxprco.;'iinp; ~c: view tl1.31 hom0$C:Xu21ity .... as 1 c:Jh.c.hc, fe.r 'l'hkh he hnrcJ tu c.lc,·tlnp s cuuu(clinft pl~n in 2 rc~c.uch cb.'is; 
""' r. AlirAi,(••. I'· R65. ·n•• other ll.\0> Slllclll<lll5 (11Uf">Und vic~<·s lhsl I truM "'l" rcsucrs will ><I mil >rc wiucly 
bcld, or .u lcu1 cmcruinc.J, ;r tC"hth· ct~· r .ard~ c:rprcs:~~tJ, nn Amrrinn nmpusc,, 
- - ---- - ---
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informally to require apology (and, in some c:tses, what looks suspiciously like 
University of Beijing-style "re-education"} 19 in response to speech expressing 
views on issues of public :mc.l campus concern, did indeed present an easy case. 
If questions that go to the core of human rights and social policy issues cannot 
be freely debated on campuses, what issues can? 
The regulation established a general, content-based regime of censorship of 
polilically and socially controversial speech, with speech concerning issues of 
race, gender, and sexual orientation subject to special restriction. Worse, within 
that content-defined field of regulation, the censorship regime imposed a 
vie.,..-point-spc:cific orthodoxy: students were allowed to state radical or liberal, 
but not conservative or reactionary, views on controverted issues. They could) say th:u the mental abilities of blacks were equal to or greater than those of 
whites, but not lesser; th:ll homosexuality was a culturally . formed category of 
scxu:1l preference or a natural inclin:uion, but not a disease or a sin; - th:1t 
women's genetic endowments made them equ:~ l or superior to men in socially 
v::llued activities, but not inferior. 20 
Viewed from the civil -liberties perspective, regulations such as these are highly ) 
suspect because they arc aimed squarely at the content of speech rather than 
1 
·I at its incidcnt:1l injurious consequences. Under current First Amendment doctrine, 
no restriction focused on the communicative impact of speech is permissible 
unless it· is necessary to prevent serious and imminent harm; the harm in 
question cannot be simply o!Tcnsc, however strong and justified, at what is s:~id.) 
., Finally, any restriction within these narrow confines must be uviewpoint neutral." 

:> The urH.Icrlying idea is that there must be no itleologic:~l censorship - no

.. 
,. orficial regime: ofscreening utterances for the political, moral, or soci;~l acceptability
.. 
of the: message they dclivcr.11 uThe First Amendment recognizes no such thing 
as a 'false' idea."22 The idea behind this slogan need not be a par!llyzcd relativism. 
a It can be a histOrically-founded liberal suspicion that officials are peculiarly 
un likely to accurately disti nguish falsity from truUt under a regime of censorship,a :~s c>:pressed in Justice Jackson's" classic Bamctlr opinion:
., 
:) 1' J'ur (UmpJc. • •1utl~n; who h>d t«ilcd I hnmnrho\)ic limerick in clnt piU•bllplntd lht dtOJlplnJ a£ 0 d)>t~< >J(lliMI him. under tht Michit>n ft!'Jiationt In lciUm £or • ehnraom •rolosr, • lcncr or apology IO lhc 
umru• p>p<r. and ancndancc •• a "py np oution;• Do< "· U•iwnity .[Mi<AiK""· p. 86S. It hu become 1 
comrn•tnrh cc: .Jmnnl ci"'ii-Ubtnubn opr<mcnu of verb::. I h:arusmcn! feruladon to 1trcu d1r utU.1y o( •c:duutJon•
"\ (ulhcr than d!Kil'linary 1'\Jk>) U I remedy for omrus dlscrimin~lion, (CncnJ!y wllhOUI much scnuus Ollt!1UoD
.J 
1u tl1c qur,tinn nf -.·h~l ,uch ·cdm:~lion• may e-nuit In my own view. the: won.t of both worldt l.s tcbieved •hen 
muhiruhu rol «n•ioi,;l)' lf>ining (nlu•blc u it c1n be when .June well) I• Imposed u 1 penal unction fot 
haru•mcnr , ( o<out.J 1h1tply '"ff>r>l< J'Ufti)hmcnl of hat>Urncnt (which thnuld be Confined IO CUU of lnltntioru.J 
'"'''"~.J,.in~) frnm oricn111ion drnn• oimcd., •cquainrinr student.< and o1hcn .nth lhc divcnc cuhural bockJrOund" 
..cr<curinnt. and t cnsiti••itiu !hey ate lihly to mcCI In lhc tontcmp<>nry uni•<nil)'. 
10 Thc pbintifT in the ~lichigan o sc "''U 1 P')'<holo,- gndu>le ttudcnl worklnB on lhc biologicol bulo of 
J ifTucncn in pcr«>n.alil)' traiu >nJ me nul abilitiu. I tc >llcgcd, quilt plautlbly, lhal rcru in lhcoricr in hls field 
cnuld he rcrcci<td u •uht or u cis1 , •n •h•t lhcir discussion mighl be unc1ion.ablc under the rollcy. D.t o. 
.\ht AitD•. p. MSH. 
11 An uccllrnl >nd of~tn·cilcd ,lo.;\rin>l m>ly•is, di•linp;uishins 1hc key ltmu or an' a "communicalivc lmroct." 
·ronren•: •nd ·,;,,.f'Oinl," is GcrorTr<y Stan<, •cantenl Regula~ion and 1he F'lnt Amcndmcnl," ll'i/H- ..J 
•\f • .., 1.•• Rn--rw. •nt 2S ( 1983), I'· lH9. 
11 /lwuln M~111<i•r ,._ r.t,r/1. lOR S. Ct. l\71>, 879 (198R); comport Crru ~. Robnt Writ~. ~t8 U.S. 32l, ll9 
(I 'IH). 
:;; 
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If there is any star fixed in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no offici:~!, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .. .2l 
Or it can be a republican faith in the citizenry's ability to respond to bad speech 
with bener speech, as in Justice Brandeis's equally classic Whitney opinion: 
Fear or seriou:; injury alone cannot justify suppression of free 
speech ... Those who won our independence by revolution were not 
cowards ... If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy 
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. uH 
The civil-libcnics :~n :~ly tical fr:~mework tenus to confine regulation of c:~mpus 
verbal harassment to prohibiting conduct verging on assault, including perhaps 
tortious "intention:~! infl iction of emotional distress" and ccnain face-to-face 
insults th:~t arc especially likely to provoke immediate violence · - so-c:~llcd 
"fighting words." FurtJ1cr, the civil-liberties framework requires that any speech 
regulations must be evenhanded; universities may not single out ideologically 
defined classes of provocations or verbal assaults for prohibition. This, let it be 
uid, is the moderate civil-libertarian position. Civil-liberties purists find even 
the ~emotional distress" and "fighting words" theories insufficiently content­
neutral and so oppose n11y disciplinary measures against verbal harassment 
whatever- even in the extreme Wisconsin ex;~mplc I mentioned ahove. 25 
For some, of course, the ·civil-rights and civil-liberties approaches arc not 
"perspectives" on this problem; rather, one or the other of these :1pproachcs 
simply states the rcaliry of Ute situation. Thus on the civil-rights side, many 
students at Stanford were sincerely shocked when free speech concerns led 
university authorities not to prosecute the llccutoven poster episode at Stanford 
that I described above. A number of them described this as :in instance c){ 
12king something that was cl~arly one thing - · :i racist atrocity, which if left 
unpunished established an officially condoned practice of discrimination - and 
"ruming it into" a civil liberties issue. Later in the year, when members o( a 
left-activist student coalition seized {forcibly, but without causing personal injury ~ 
or property damage) the ofTicc of Ute p!)Csidct'll of the university, they cited the 
u Wnt YittinU. Stlltr Bo•rJ •/ EJ.(atio• v. Bornrttr, J 19 U.S. 6H, 613 (t9H). Comr>re Tr:r4J v. ]•~••••. 109 
S. Ct. 2SJJ, 2S+i: •tf lht~ Is 1 bed roc~ principle undrrl.rlns 1hc r;.,, Amcndmcnl, il is lh>l lhc govemmcnr 
lbaJ' 	not prohibh the cxprcnion of >n id u bcnusc JOCi<l)' finds the idea itscl£ offensive or di<>gret>btc.• 

"Wlit•ry v. Co.liforni... lH U. S. JS7, 377 (1927). 

~The moderate view ;, ts~cldly well mkul>1cd, by • present General Counsel of the AC.I.• U, in N >dinc 

Sttoucn, "Rc!'Jbrins C.mpur S~rrht A Modest Prof>oul: Dwlr u~. Jowrn•( p. ~8J . S1ruucn, like other 

.OO.rsltt, Is more skrpdc•l o( lhc "lish!ing words" !han of lhc •cmotinn>l disll'css" nrion>lc. The puri" ,;cw 

It ~fcmblc from F'ronltlyn llaiman. S,m •ntl [..,. ;,. • FIT( Sorirty (Chlor>: Uni•mhy of Chic.ago. I?Rl) . 

IWman ohogclhcr rcjecu lhe "lnsult int or lighdnc words" dOCtrine, (pp. 131-JS, 2SI>-S9); he ""''ulcJ confine 

llncdorn for 't'Crb.lf in Oictinn of tmnUnn-al dl.UttJ.S to CU.CI o( injury duou,h intcnrinn:~d (Jctu11 misrcprcscnutirH\w. t~S-S6). 	 . 
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I 
Beethoven incident as one of their main grievances; when they were charged 
(:md ultimately found guilry) under the universiry disciplinary code for the 
takeover, they so~id it was an irony that their "peaceful protest" had been punished 
while this clear incident of racist persecution had been treated as protected free 
speech. 
On the other side, many civil libertarians simply do not see the problem as 

invoh·ing issues of civil rights or discrimination at all. It is not a clash of equal 

protection and free speech, they insist, but a pure civil liberties issue, in which 

fr:.gilc free speech values are threatened by powerful political pressure groups 

on liberal campuses. For these civil libertarians, protecting discriminatory verbal 

harassment is no diiTcrcnt from protecting flag-burning; it represents the principled 

defense of reason against the perennial collective emotional impulse to censor, 
16 
rather than answer, the speech of unpopular and oflen unpleasant dissenters. 
1\ly own view is that there arc plenty of good reasons, and plenty of worthy p:~ssions, on both sides of the issue. And they seem to me really to be sides ­
muwally incommensurable perspectives- rather th::tn the poles of a well-defined 
ron tinuum along which negotiators may approach each other in se-arch of a 
17 
solution that measurably splits the difference betweefl them. The epigraph to 
this essay occurs in the course··.of Wittgenstcin's famous discussion of the 
ambiguous "duck-rabbit" drawing, which can appear as either a duck or a 
r:.bhit, depending. on how you look at it.28 You can learn facility at shifting 
between seeing the figure as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit, but at any moment 
it appears only in one aspect or the other. The campus harassment issue has 
something of the same quality. 
11 
Let me now describe the proposal I originally drafted, which was recently 
adopted as a disciplinary rule covering discrimin::ttory verbal harassment at 
Stanford.1Q The pro\'ision is an attempt to accommodate competing values, to 
mctliatc the incommensurable conflict of civil-liberties and civil-rights approaches 
on this i~!'ll<.:. 1 am not conf•Jent that it is better th:tn other mediating solutions, 
though I on ~·he a rc::~son li1r the choice of e:tdl of its clements. llut I do 
''II h>' hccn m)' l'",.on>l c~<ricncc in dcha.rin~ 1his i.suc wilh colleagues >nd stuJcniS lhal few causes anract 
m•><C l"'"'crful (l<'lnli"nal aJhcrcn« 1han Jocs First Amendment ah!IOiutism. I make 1hc f'Olnl nol lo disparar 
rl"' »p<CI of their commilment, hut bcc>u.c chillibcn•rians frequen1ty po5e ll1c •crbal harusmenl issue (lyl'tcally ~ith •n•lnjry 111 1hc O•~·humin~ i"uc) •s a dash between "reuon" on !heir side and "cmotinn" on <he olhcr. 
( ln rhc urhcr <ide. 11111 a few chil·ri~hiS cr•li~arians lake up 1he same binary-OVPOsition betwc<n "ruson" and 
"p><<iun" •nd rum ir uound ro accu>e fret spccch dcfcndc~ of <he mor>l defecl of ccrebrol and unfcclinc 
c1ici,m.
"tncnmmcmur>hk cnnfli<IS arc, r<tught~. lhn.c we hHe 10 ruolvc in 1he ah"ncc of • salisfaCiory detcrmininc 
"""" (<uh,unriH rule . apcc•t rrucedur<, or e<unmon mcrric). They ue nol con1udictions 2nd need not 1>4 
rc<nhol "irnlinnall~." ·"' ~ouJ discu"ion of value-incommensuubitity in ll•e cunlext of indh·idu•t >clion can 1>4 
lnunJ in .lu"rh R>1, Tlor . ll<~r•/itr of fr((Mm, J21~6 (Oxford: Clarrndun l'rcss, t'lR6). 
'' \\iu~cn<rcin. P~ilm"('hit•l hn·fllix•'i""'· r· 1'14. 
z··t \u:: IC\t or lh(' Su.nfnnl rc:pa)Jiilln h ~\en in the Appendix. 
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believe that some such accommodating solution, as against a "principled" choice 

implementing one ~ppro:tch to the exclusion or the other, is needed.30 

The first section of the provision restates Stanford's policy on free expression, 

including an insistence that students must learn to .,tolerate even expression of 

opinions which l11ey rmd abhorrent ." Counterposed is a second section restating 

the university's existing policy against discrimination "in the administration or 

its educational policies" on the basis of "sex, race, color, handicap, religion, 

sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin," and adding tl1at harassment 

on the basis of these characteristics can, when cumulated, constitute hostile 

environment discrimination under the policy. The third section notes that the· 

free expression and anti-discrimination policies conflict on the issue of ' 'erllal 

harassment; it provides that "protected free expression ends and prohibited 

discriminatory harassment begins,.. at the point wh1=rc expression of opinion 

becomes "personal vilification" ofa student on the basis ofone of the characteristics 

stated in the a~ti-discrimination policy. 

The operative part of the provision comes in the fourth and last section, 

which defines "personal vilification" as speech or other symbolic expression that 

(a) is intended to insult or stigmatize individuals on the basis of one of the 
designated characteristics; (b) is "addressed directly" to those insulted or 
stigmatized; and (c) makes use of "insulting or 'fighting' words," defined (quoting 
from Chap/indy v. Nrw Hampshirc-11 ) as words (or non-verbal symbols) that ~by 
their very utterance inOict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach or ~ 
the peace." 
Finally, the proposal adds a narrowing proviso designed to adapt the Cl:aplimJ:y 
insulting-or-fighting words concept to civil-rights enforcement. In the context 
of discriminatory harassment, punishable words (or symbols) arc defined as 
those "commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt 
for human beings on the basis of" Lhe characteristi•cs specified in the anti­
discrimination policy - :1 phrase meant to capture the sense of the common 
expression "racial epithets" and to extend it to other prohibited forms of 
discrimination. 
To summarize, the mlc wouhJ punish speech directed . to individuals: speed; 
meant to insult them em the basis of a prutcr.:tctl cha.r:tcteristic that also makes 
IJSC Of One of the gutter epithetS or bigotry. It thus adC•ptS one clement of what t' 
\ have called the "moderate civil libertarian" view or harassment regulation; it 
prohibits only expression that falls roughly 'within the categories of fighting 
words or intentional inflir.:tion of emotional distress doctrines. The provision 
therefore only prohibits a very narrow category of expression, immunizing even 
lO One example of m >hcrnarh·c m<tliating solu1iun was the siru•linn 21 Sr•nfi•ld hc(urc •Joption o( 1hc 
lwusmrnl provisioo. The unh·ersil),., rrcsidcnt and ~cncul counsel had uid puhlidy th>t (>c<·ln·f•cc u1c uf 
Mia\ cpilltcll cuuld be cunsiJrrcd 111 •·iuhte lhc lun~·stanJlns "l'unJ>tncnlat Sr•ndnJ" which rcquirnl o( 
wdcnu cnnduct on•nifeuin~ such "ICSpccr fur the ril(hu of nthcn. " is cll(l<etcd u( i""" cititcns.· Thnush that 
oolunon 1•" t~ lillie suid>nCe tn s> . i~fr civil llhcnics concerns in nty vicy,·, il .,.., in the umr h>llp>tO. " the 
..,. later •dt~ptc.l. 01her cunorlrs nf mcdi•rin~t soluriuns include 1hc rt~larion >~lnptrd •• 11te University of 
Calilnmi• an•l rhr one l'"'f"l<td 21 rhc llni•·crshy nr Tens. Sec Rill< .12 hrlu•·. 
"JIS U.S. Stoll, S72 (19H). t 
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the vilest h:~tc-spccch a<.l<.lr~sscd generally to a campus audience as well as many 
serious face-to-face discriminatory verbal assaults. Many students of color and 
other Ci\"il-rights ad\'Ocatcs at Stanford have opposed it, for these reasons, as 
ton weak an anti-discrimination measure. 
At the same time, narrow as it is, the proposal retains enough of the civil­
rights appro:~ch to trouble most civil libertarians. It seems to violate the second 
cernt:il civi'l-liberlie.s .tenet: not only can speech be regulated only to the minimum 
extent necessary to prevent immediate and otherwise unremcdiable harm; further, 
any speech regulation must be nmtral- generally neutral as to content, certainly 
neutral as to viewpoint. The provision's apparent violation of the neutrality 
constraint results directly from its being framed as civil-rights protection or 
anti-discrimination measure . 
To hrin.g out the neutralitY problem, I need to describe more fully the legal 
ur1,fc -~pinnings of the proposal. It docs not precisely track either of the most 
common oases for narrow discriminatory harassment regulations: the "fighting 
words~ or "intentional inniction. of emotional distress" rationales, which have 
been adopted at other universities in the wake of the Michigan case.32 Rather, 
it draws on the rcJe,·ant common clements in those two theories, adapting them 
to the comext of a civil-rights-based campus harassment regulation. 
In 1hc: Choplinsl')' case, a unanimous Supreme Court excluded from First 
Amendment protection "insulting or 'fighting' words," those which "by their 
\'cry utterance inflict injury" or that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace." Subsequent cases have focused on the "breach of the peace" half of 
the category, and the Court has made clear that its reach is narrow indeed; it 
has never affirmed a conviction under the doctrine since ChaplinsAry itself in 
1942.n During those years, the Court has also developed the "heckler's veto" 
doc1rinc :Is :1 counterweight to its "fighting words" proviso, putting the burden 
on law enforcement to protect speakers against threatened violence, rather than 
a,·oiding the "iolence by silencing the s:peaker.H · 
The heckler's veto an:~lysis brings out the weakness in the "fighting words" 
dot·trinc as it w:~s tra<.litiun:tlly formu b ted. The concept seems to ask purely 
!3ctu:~l and prc<.lictivc questions. Can imminent violence be expected from an 
auJicncc? Arc a"ailablc law cnfi>rcemcnt resources insufficient to protect the 
sreaker? As many civil libertarians have argued, however, it seems inconsistent ) 
with free speech values to punish a speaker simply because the heckler's veto 
' 
1 The L:n;\C,.ity uf Califnmia ha< adopted a rrohibition on student hornsmcnl by •figttting words." dcfin<el 
>< -thn~c. r<nonatly ahush·c q>ilhcl> "'hich, when dirtetly addrnscd 10 any ordinary pcBDn arc, in the contal 
u<rd and u • man<r of common trno.. tcdJe, inherently likely lo provoke • violent reaction "'hctlter or not !be-y 
JClua1ty dn ~.· Thcu •inc\udc, hut 2rC' not \imitrd to• terms abu1i't't:: in tenns of ncC". Kl, or th~ other Cll~JOrid 
of di<erimination Ia•·. llaunmcnt occurs •·hen filhtintt words ore uscd to "create • hostile and lntimldatlnJ 
cmironmcnt" "'hich the uncrcr should know Y.itl in1erfere 'flith lhc victim's education . 
. \ (O)ntminec 2llhc L"ni>trsirr of Tens has pro(IOScd. rccul>rion of•nclal hara..mcnl"lncklng !he RcSIOI<mml 
nf Ton• .tclinitinn ••f inrcnliunal inOictiun uf emotional diurcss, wirh rhe •d.tldon of rhe eltmcnt of Intent to 
"harn•. intimid>l<, nr humili>le ... nn account of race, color or nariunal origin." Esr•blishlnr • violulon nqulmt 
.1n JCIUJ( ~hmlin~t u( •nH·r(' ('ffiOiiun.a( t.Ji~.trcu• on rhc part of the victim. 
"Sec G·~m t'. f."•l!fi•,.,i•. -\{)) IJ.S. 15 (1971); G,.Ji•tv. ll'it.nn, iQ5 U.S. 518 (1972). 
"Cumpare C'rxo•ry ,., CAi••l" . .194 U.S . Ill (1969) ""irh Ftinrr v. N"" Yor!, HO U.S, 315 (1951). 
\ 
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is m~de effective - bcc~usc, th;u is, ~ sufficient number of thugs have plausibly 
threatened violence and available police protection is inadequate. A serious civil­
libertarian presumption in favor of free speech seems 10 require some ev~luation 
of what tl1e speaker has s~id - are they really "fighting words"? ·- before silencing 
tlte speaker in the face of a hostile audience can be said to be a proper response. 
'I11e same requirement of normative evaluation of the speech must also apply, 
it seems, in the case of intentional infliction of emotional dis1ress. And her~, 
Indeed, the ev:tluative clement is explicitly built into the standard common law 
elements of the tort. The viclim must foreseeably suffer severe emotional distress 
from what the defendant does or says, but this is not sufficient. In addition, 
the defendant's conducr must be, as Section 46 or the Torrs Restatement puts 
it, in unmistakably evaluative terms, "beyond .all possible bounds of <Jcccncy~ 
:and "regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community~ ­
in short, "ou1ragcous."35 
I suggest tl1at we interpret the Chaplinsk:J• category of "insulting or 'fighting' 
words" as designating utterances that at least meet the standard set by Rcslatement 
Section 46. For free speech purposes, though, the Section 46 standard is tno 
purely evaluative - too vague.36 But if the vagueness problem can be met (by 
delineating a category of Utlerances that ar( "outra.geous" and are given further 
and more objective defin ition), then it woul<.l be reasonable - under Chaplinsky 
- to treat those utterances as subject to prohibition because they arc likely cithrr 
to provoke violence or to cause severe emotional distress. 
The Stanford provision thus interprets CJ,ap/ins)ry's dual formulation to suggest 
a category of speech, objectively "insulting" in character, that attacks the very 
identity of its victim in such a way as to stimulate the familiar "fight or flight 
rtaction." Among certain classes of hearers, partic~iarly young males socialized 
to be physically aggressive, the typical reaction to a vile personal insult may be 
•fight." For otlters - many men; perhaps most chil<.lrcn, most" older pcqple, _ 
most women; invalids - the typical reaction to , th,is kind of verbal assault is 
some combination of extreme .fear, numbness, and impotent rage: reactions 
calculated to produce the sort of "severe emotional distress" to which the 
Restatement of Torts makes reference. We should read Chaplinsi.J•. in my view, 
10 have identified two distinct kinds of reactions (fight or night) to the same 
category of intolerable speech when it speaks, respectively, of utterances that 
•tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" an<.l those that "by their very 
uttcnnce inflict injury." 
The Stanford provision identifies discriminatory "personal vilification" as a 
class of unerances of which any instance: is particularly likely to produce one 
DRnWnnml of Tortr, 2d, >cc. ~6. commcnr (d). 
II• 'Outnrcousn=' in lhe orca of polirical •nd soci2l discounc hu •n lnhcrcnl subjccrivrncss •b.Jur il ..,hich 
..wd .Oow • fury to imJ>01c liability on the huis of lhe furon' laSicJ or views, or p«h>r< on !he hasi< of rhdr 
tWilc of • pmicutor <rpruslon.• /fw,l!rr M•tci~r ''· FtJJtzvfl, 108 S . Ct. 876, 8R2. The Coun's <lccisiun, 
lo.ntr, docs nor foreclose ttnnlinK ton damages undcr lloe "outngcou<ncss" l<sl for infli<1ion of <motion,( 
........ rhrough speech alone in • privarc or face·lo·facc context, ruhcr lh>n in ' published •nd n>tion>lly 
6otributcd l•mpoon of an impon..nr public figure, •uch as W>s involve.! in Fa(tl'r//. 
~ : 
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or the other o •...c kinds onnjury covered by the "fighting words" and "emotional 
distress" analysis. These are, in Richard Delgado's phrase, "words that wound" 
- utterances directed to members of groups specially subject to discrimination, 
intended to insult or stigmatize- them, and making use of the small class of 
commonly recognized w•onls or symbols that have no other function but to 
convey hatred and "contempt for these groups.J7 
Professor Delgado ofrcrs as the test for liability under his proposal the 
requirement that the words directed to the victim be such as "a reasonable 
person would recognize :ts a racial insult." In a campus context, where claims 
of insult and ideological debate are often intertwined, this phrasing raises special, 
and I think avoidable, civil-liberties problems. Some ideas might be taken as 
r:~.cial or ethnic insults by virtue of their content alone: for example, claims that 
th~: llolocaust never happened, or that blacks arc genetically inferior to whites. 
To 3\"c>id b:~nning ideas as such on the basis of propositional content, on campus 
or elsewhere, the St:mfcml regulation prohibits only verbal abuse including actual 
·· rlcial epithets, or their equivalents for other fonns of discrimination.38 These 
art: the all- too-familiar words that carry with them so inseparable a message of 
h;~trcd ;~nd contempt that apologies. arc in order for the affront involved in even 
quoting them: "nigger," "kikc," "faggot," "cunt," and the like.39 
Racial and other discriminatory hatred and contempt can be effectively 
c>:presscd without using these words, of course, but (partly in the interests of 
avoiding vagueness and its chilling effect) such casc:s are not included under 
the regulation. A white student can tell a black student,: face-to-face, "you 
pt:ople are inferior and should not be here," but not be guilty of harassment. 
In addition, even gutter eipthets are immunized when uttered to the campus 
or puhlic at large, in order to give the widest possible leeway for speech in .the 
puhlic foium; the Klan or the nco-Nazis may demonstrate and display their 
"Kidwcl I )d~>uu. "1\"uru' 1lu1 1\"•ounJ: A Tn" i\cciun fur R>ci>t Imulls, f.phhecs. >nd N>mc-ollinl; 
u., . .-.,J r:n·il Ri~hii·Cn i//.i~r>1on f.••• Rmr""· \'Ill. 17 (l'll!2). pp. IJJ-$1. Professor l)clg>dn lu.s :ancmbkd on 
rr. J.1(,....1~ 111 imprt"ile hml)' of evidence :and >rp:umcnl 11,1 supporiS lhe idcnrifiC•Iinn nf nci•( '<fbal obUK 
l.\ inlliulntt 2 di~o;ai~((i\c ~nu iJc:IUifi.Jbl~ (nrm of injury. )n.J w qu.illif)·ing 3S • di"inc.ivc wrong. I lit. rr~ 
j, limitt:J fo r.ult~/ in!tuh~. 
"JJn:Ju'<' I hcliC'\'C lu rhi' c:-.rcnl in lhc . ..... ,. (Jihc it!t:"u· Ur'11nd n( 1\mcric:an fir.«.• AmcnJ,mcnl l.21w, I rcim 
~t4•H(l \lcf.Hruriun 1nd h.11c Sp<c<h ptuhihit iun.$ uf lht kinJ c,Ucd fnr b7 the fntcm~Linn~l \~·nvc:-ntlun on lhc 
l.limirutiun uf All Fumu flf R2'-"h.l Ui.urimin1tion: •st3Cc-s l')n1cs • . . ih211 declare IS 3n offence rubtilhabk 
h~ 11 .... •II Jj,~('min11ion u( idc:n b.a~ . c..J ('" ucbl surt-rintif)' or hJircd . .. ... t..bri Mauud::t 2bly ltJUa the 
~·JUU J ') \i~;'4', ur~n~ m•x.lificll_itm nJ Fitl. l Amc:odmcr\1 b,w In pcnnh the clC1cn$ion n( a limited version of the 
int<m>ti,.n>l ":anclucl cu 1hi~ c..unll)' in -rublic Response 10 R•cist Speech: Consid<rins the Viclim'o St"'}; 
.II.. A•t•• ,.., • . Rn·inr. \nl. 117 (1 111!'1). p. 2J20. ,\s Pcofcssnr 1\bt$\nh"s mid< clocumcncs. msny Western cuunlrln 
h•>< ,u,•h ''"~ · Thr C>nJJi•n h>ll' ·>recch >Uiucc h currrnll)" undu rc'·icw b)· the Supreme \.nun of C.nado 
[, , il< ("'"i<l<nC)' " i<h 1hc fr<e C\rr•:,sion tnJ>r•nlcc of che rcccncly adopu·d Gnuli•n Chutcr of Riahu .... 
1'u•celun\'\. 
,., h "uuld he pu"iblc. in I he inll·rc,l< nf mnimum cbrit)'. Ill •llcmpt > Cumprch~n<ivc list of the "cliscrimiiUIOIJ 
hKl"i"' w .. ru'• ancl c4uiulcnt ,;,u>l >)ntht•l> (swa\libs. huming crossu. etc.). I 1hink this would be 1 mi.uw; 
nr~ n>mpl« of >uch ""rc.Js •nc.l ~)·mbols •rc cun~un~ly being in,·cntcd by the cru1i1"ily of 1hc collccliwc hlf"'C'4 
minJ . r .\C'n "ilhnul • dcfinili\'C li•t. htiii·C•cr. the St:anfnrd rczubtion givu clurrr nolicc of wh>t will cnunl .. 
'" ~ollrn" th>n '"l ulhcr 'imibr prur•'•~•l I lnn~<· . I should >cld thai as I undcr$l>nd chc prn'lislnn. dcniJihWJ 
o·pioh'·" >inwu >1 (~<hilr) nalinnal nri!(in ~ruur• ("d,~u." ·t•ot.ck," tiC.) wnulu cnmc "itloin its ccrms tu the c.....C 
lht·~ ""l"rC' UctnmincJ to ht" !~.lill '"comnwn)~· und('nuw,d.. In ""cum:ty dirccl anc.l "sccul lutrcd or contempt• • 
thl' hl\i!l. ot 'ut,onll uripn. 
,~ 
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symbols and shout Lltcir words of hatred with impunity. This very much narrows 

the reach of the proposal and exposes ir to the charge, mentioned before, that 

it is mere tokenism. Bur ar the saine rime, it helps meet traditional and lcgitimalc 

civil-liberties con_cerns about public political expression, and abour vagueness 

and its accompanying chilling effect. •o 
The Stanford prO\'ision has also been drafted with an eye on another concern 

- one root.cd in the civil-rights perspective, and oflen noted as well in chil­

libertarian objections to "hate speech" or "group defamation" regulations!' The 

concern is illustrated by one of Lhc cases that occurred under the Michigan 

regulation. A black woman law student, in the course of a heated argument, 

called a classmate "white trash." She was charged with a violation of the 

harassmcm rule; she uhimatcly agreed to write a formal lcHer of apolot,'Y to 

the classma1e in settlement of the charge .. 
Under the Stanford provision, calling a while student "white lrash" would 
nor constitute harassment. In its commonly undcrslood meaning, the term is 
Oike "redneck") derogatory to the poor whites of-the rural South by vinue of 
their class, not their racc.H If 1he student addressc.:d came from that social 
background, and if dass bias were a form of discrimin:Jtion covered · by the 
proposal (as it is ll<ll), there might be a disciplinary case. BUI as a white person, 
she is not a victim of discriminatory racial harassment; the term "white trash'' 
is clearly not "commonly understood" to convey hatred or contempt for whites 
on the basis of their race as such - a requirement for liability under the 
provision. This is not 1<1 deny that the black wom:m student intended to express 
flee-based hatred or co ntempt, .or that she may have effectively <::onvcycd a 
flcial insult, just as a white st.udent docs who tells a black student that "you 
people arc inferior and shouldn't he here." In neither case, though, is th~ regulation violated, because in neither case is Lhcre usc of one of the re­
quired "commonly undcrsto()(J" assaultive epithets or symbols of <liscriminatory
•rontcmpt 
The point of the "white trash" case can he generalilcd, and i~ a way th:tt 
is most troubling tel ci\"il libertarian defenders of viewpoint neutrality. As bes1 
I can sec, there :1re no epithets in ·this society at this time that nrc "cornmonly 
understood" to convey hntrcd anti contempt for whites ns wch. The same c:1n 
be said, I believe, of males as such, and heterosexuals :.1s such. •·1 If Lhis is 
,, 
•nc nmow Ccttofincmcnt ur ,,,.. """""CitC rc~ol>riun tu chc usc of 1hc p1Cicr rpi•hels •lsn rn•rhui'" ch>l 
'lo munc u ;n >llli · cliscrimiuuiun rrm·i•!un. no1 a "chility rule." As • l<>rl•cr. I " 'uuiJ ""' Icc Slutlcnc$ >tlt.lro<s 
ed ocher In doss using pcrsnnall)· tlcno~>llory lcrms nf >R)" kind. >ncl ,..,..,tel cxclutlr scu,lcnts whu rcr>i"ccl in 
... so. Thu Is • civilily n>lc, slnoibr In lhot<r >pJ'Iicd in mo11 American ('><liamrnt>ry hutlics. Such rules src 
... In "') "l•ininn, •rrropri>IC rur camru•- .. ·i,J,. cnfnrccmcnt. The t>nlflU< shnulll he rh..u~hr ur .. prinurily ' 
p:emJ puhlic furum, >ncl sccnntl:arily >I > " 'urkpbrc (lhc wnrk nf cdur>tiun). I wnulcl >Jclth>l ufuc. uf rt•$hlcnli•f 
Jllt>cy m•y juuil)· no nrc ~rringcnt fC[Clll>liun nf ,fTcndvc ·~cch in Mudrnr clmmilur in lh>n in cJ.,.,..,ms ur In ~ c.mrus :areas, hut thi~ is • t·umpln is>~•o ,..hid1 I cannc.t Ire>! adctiCWrlr hrrc . ~Thi1 is che conccm ra lonl h)" Justkr Ill><~ In his .Jlumt from 1hc Surrcmc r.nun"• dcchi"n •us~>iuing 
-inion of • white udst tlamphlrlr<r under • grnup titocl si>Cut": "If there lor >nr minnri1y ~wups who l12il 
6io '-'l ot inr U lhclr YiciOI). lhC)· mi~hc Cllll,itlcr lht pn.<sihlc fclt'>tiCC ur lhi; >n<'irol rcm>ro : 'i\n111hcr lUCh 
'*"'l ond l•m unclunc."" llrouAmodu t ·. m,.,,;, . .H.I U.S. 2SU. 27~ (I?Sl), 
•tnclccd in iu usu:al •rn<r .• rhc ltrm b ituplirill)" nci.c Cnlqrd f'\"nplc nf ~"'"'- l'irh ill ionp!ic al iuu 11f 1urprhc11.1 • ~Aitr r<non "'""'I ~c .,,._,h," 
., rulft< lh>t Cll!ttrs "''~'" ·li~·~·ce ~hh lhi,. cicinp; t(rm• sud... "hunk)." -~ngn.· "httrclcr." <I 
0 
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intlced a socio-linguistic 1fact, it is of course one not fixed in stone; on the 
other hand, it is no accident. The denigrating epithets covered by the Stanford 
provision are able 10 inflict the serious and distinctive injuries characteristic of 
lcplly prohibited invidious discrimination because they strike at groups subjected 
to longstant!in~ and deep-rooted prejudices widely held and disseminated 
throu~hout our culture. American children grow up with the negative stereotypes 
of blacks, women, and homosexuals in their bones and 'in their souls. This is 
tragically true, too, of children who are black, female, or later identify themselves 
as homosexual. 
The denigrating epithets draw their capacity to impose the characteristic civil­
rights injury to "hearts and minds" from the fact· that they turn the whole 
socially and historically inculcated weight of these prejudices upon their victim. 
Each hatemonger. ~ho invokes one of these terms summons a vicious choms 
in his support. It is because, giv~n our cultural history, no such gt:rrtral prejudices 
strike against the dominant groups that there exist no comparable terms of 
universally understood hatred and contempt ;~pplicable to whites, males, and 
heterosexuals as such.H 
Ill 
The Stanford provision, then, while neutral on its face, will foreseeably be 
asymmetric in its application. This aspect of the provision allows its interpretation { ' 
to reflect a state of aITa irs central to civil-rights analysis- the continued existence 
of asymmetric social relations of group domination and subjugation in the United 
:;.States. Contrary to the democratic ideal, American .society {like other societies) 
•J:is still characterized by a hierarchy of relatively srable ascriptive status groups. 
..r 
To rephr:tse the poinr from the jargon of sociology 10 the rhetoric of movement d 
politics, there still exist "oppressor" and "oppressec.l" (or, 10 lower t..he politie2l ' 
·! 
pitt:h, "privileged" and "subonlinaled") groups, identified as such by characteristics ' 
.. 
such as race, gender, class,.and sexual preference. Indeed, the civil-rights project 
:i can hest be understood as at once premised on the existence of these groups' 
asymmetric power relations and aimed at the ultimate elimination of the 
asymmetries. (To describe it rhus is not to decide in advance the dcbauble 
) 
m~ ;<l( do n~>t """" ,.·hirh of the;c temu >~c cuncnt orn.l >trioudy·uuJ •rhhcb orlmrcd or contempt - c•M<n« 
th>t th<)' '" nnt "wmmonly unJasuiOd" u •uch. On lhr olhcr sidr, no sentient bbck, l..atino, or p y Amnl«<l 
1
.. 
(. 
h.. ' "l d .. uht ...... , the current .undud lnsuhinr C'f'llhets for their roupt. ., 
~ 
·;
":\ simil>r >n>l)Si• •rrtirs tn thr unjustified usc 11f the tenn "white r•dst." "hlch many of my white studcntl 
h>oo inw~cd '' the cquintrnt. •rrllcd In lhrm. of the sundnd rocbl cpilhctJ u •rrlicd to the studcntl ol 
.· 
'"'"' t .n•in1 '" unc siJc "htthcr uniu•tifitd use n( a ttnn like this lnnicLS the umc level of Injury, h doa 
n~ot in a·ny e•·cnt cnmc -..ithin the cl>>< of injuriu ll••t conC<m civil rishLS law and policy. The tcnn "whitt 
nci•t- Jnc; not dcnip~cc "hitcs ~• t•tA, ony more thsn "bbc1t. scporatist racist" dcnirrat« blocks u 1\Kh. Iii 
aJ.Iitiun, mnn~ ci•·il-lihcnic• ~onsidct>tinns Jistini'Ji~h the uus. Tc11111 of ~litif41abusc like "white nclo1• (ot 
· su.tini,t." "Kui." -~<rruri,t') >« ><>mctimcs acruutcl)· and •rrmrri •tdy aprlicd to lndMduals In robust dcbo!Y; 
cu t•tly .. hen chry l'"lf'<'l!' •rrl)". h .. ,. .....,, iJ rnlitlull~ cnntrnvenhl. In contrut, the Stan(ord prmlslon rnta 
"" tloc rr.mi'c that the ncial (>II~ otlon) discrimin11ory I'Jil<r epithets It dealt with ore "twr awmprialel, 
~;,, .,,,, u l n~ i' i~u>l<; en(urccmcnt co( chc pro'i~inn, therefore, .Jncs not invoh·e lhe palltic•lly ch~r&cJ t"l ol 
Ji,nin1in.uinF hcNttn iu,1ihcJ :~nJ uniu\otificd uses. 
. I~) 
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question of affinnalive action -the ques;tion of whether symmetric or asymmetric 
policies are best suited to attain the goal.) 
Given its narrow coverage, the Sranford provision obviously does not embody 
a particularly radical or utopian civil-righ1s approach. Its categories and its thrust 
largely reflect a civil-libenies perspective on the racial harassment problem. The 
exclusive remedy it contemplates for all but a tiny fraction of discrimina!·ory 
speech is !he one civil libertarians favor: more speech. But the features it adop!s 
from a civil-rights approach still jar most civil lib~rtarians; indeed, they jar me 
when 1 look at the problem through a civil-liberties lens. First, the provision 
lacks content-neutrality; it regulates only speech bearing on marters of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, and the like while neglecting other speech that might 
5imilarly provoke violence or cause similarly severe emotional distress. Second, 
and even more troubling, the rule bears asymmetrically on its restricted subject 
m.:lller in a way that, to some, will seem inconsistent with viewpoint-neutrality. 
That is, it may seem biased against the disfavored ideologies of racism, sexism, 
and homophobia, openly favoring "politically correct" egalitarians against their 
adversaries in !he campus marketplace of opinion. It arguably takes from the 
bigots emotively powerful rhetorical weapons - the traditional hate epithets ­
without imposing comparable restrictions on the other side. It is as if renns 
like "commie" and "pink0" were barred from political debate, while "imperialist 
lackey" :md "capitalist running dog" were allowed. This seems to viobte official 
neutrality: the principle or "no orthodoxy in matters of opinion," "no such thing 
a.s a false idea." 
This civil-libertarian objection helps bring out. the c.leep strueture of the 
conflict between the two approaches. From the civil rights perspeetive, there 
arc false ideas and ideologies, among which white supremacy and related forms 
of bigotry are the paradigm examples. The insult and stigma ·i~~olved i!l .rhe .. 
Imposition of supremacist ideologies on those whom they oppress and exclude 
from full citizenship attacks what John Rawls has called the most func.lamental 
of those "primary goods" that government is established to allow individuals to 
pursue - those that form the basis of self-respecr.~s The protection of the basis 
of the individual's capacity for self-respect againsr violation by socially authoritative 
humiliation is as much at the heart of equal protection as is official viewpoint­
neutrality in regulating tJ1e marketplace of idea.s th~t is at the heart of free 
expression. 
The analysis of the civil-rights approach in terms of preventing exclusion by 
the social imposition of c~ste-_bascd stigma supplies the standard ' rationale for 
the central doctrine of modem .ami-discrimination law: the rejec~on of the 
•scpu:ate but equal" version of Jim Crow. 46 The doctrinal problem was this: 
A st2te supplies equal (but separate) facilities to whites and blacks - schools, 
public parks, beaches, buses, amenities in public buildings, etc. 1-Iow docs this 
"John 1Uwl1, A 11tt<>ry •f]ullir< (\.amb ridsc: llorvard, 1971), pp. 178-79, H0-16, HJ-·17. 
"II,._ o. s..,,, t{ £Jut»tt"tm, Ji7 U.S. i8) (19Si); «c olso Al•yor of B•lrimnrr t•. D•"',."· JSO U.S. R77 
(1955) (bcochu); c.,r- "· Bro..Jn, JS2 u_o;_ 90J (1956) (bum); 1/o/,us v. CiiJ •[Arlut4. JSO U.S. 879 (1955) 
(aolf COUtKs); J•Aruon t•. Vi'K''"i•. 373 U.S. 61 (196]) (courthousu) . 
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Cl(u:dity-prc:serving separat~n of the races violate the Constitution's prohibition 
of racially un(qualtreatment? The Bronm line of C2ses answers that the inequality 
inheres in the subordinating character of the mwage delivered by the separation 
- the material state action, separate b1:1t equal segregation, viewed in isolation 
from its communicative impact, fully preserves equality. Plmy had said that if 
hbck people felt insulted by the separation, that was only their interpretation; 
Brown finally (and re:~lisric:tlly) accepted that the insulting interpretation was the 
only plausible one.""' 
Dut the Pks~y formula is a quite appropriate response to a complaint of 
Jiscriminatory segregation in some social contents. Separation sometimes stig­
matizes no one. -The maintenance of separate men's and women's restrooms in 
public buildings, for example, does not by itself constin1te invidious sex 
discrimination. But in the context of this society and its history, the Jim Crow 
nric1y of racial segregation imposed inequality because it rested on the assumption, 
;~ nd hence delivered the message, that whites were a superior caste to be 
prnu:ctcd fmm the polluting contact of their black inferiors. The insulting 
messlge, the wound inflicted by the authoritative endorsement of the "false 
idea" of white supremacy and black""unworthincss, was what made Jim Crow 
unconstitutionai.~K 
Essentially the same wound is the injury inflicted on minority, female, and 
gay students or employees when endemic verbal abuse renders educational or 
work environment discriminatorily "ho~ilile" within tl1e tenns of discrimination 
l:!w. In this sense, the focus on symbc•lic injury to tl1e "hearts and minds" of 
hl:lck children in the desegregation cases supplies the basic authority for campus 
,·c rhal harassment regulation; Bromn, as Charles Lawrence strikingly argues, 
Mm ay be: read as regulating the content of racist spccch."~9 
- The civfl-libenarian, dediclted to a principle of liberal official neutrality in 
the markcrplace of ideas, sees this as a perverse misstatement of 'Brown. It 
,ignores rwo crucial distinctions, the argument runs: speech vs. action, and public 
vs. private. 5 ° First, the civil-libertarian insists that the practiet: of white (or male, 
' ' / 1/m.r ,.. f"r~u•••. II>J t:.S. SJ7, SS I (I S?6), rejectinB lh~ cl>im that "the enforced separation of the two 
r>.-c~ ' ""'P' che cn1orc.J ucc '""ilh a bo.Jgc n_( infcrinril)'" on <he ,.-ound c}ut "(ilf this be to, It Is not by teuon 
,( ' "! ohin~ found in <he ttl, hu1 snlely bcuu>e 1he cnlnre.J race chooses to put that construction upon h." 
C:wnp>rc B"'""' c·. fi,.,,J •{ I:'Jutori""· H7 U.S. ~83, ~94 (19H). 
" t-:umuml Cahn c~rly on ofTcrcJ 1hi' utiun.Jfc :u; 'he: ptopc-r inlcrprctalion of Brvwr~: 
.'\, is nh•ct\'t <l in Lloe •nd eno Uahylonian T>lmud. tO ~h>me >nd degude a fdlow-crururc b 10 
wmmit • kinJ oof I''Y<'hie tn>yhcm upnn him. u•e •n :uuibnt's knife, humili>tion slashes his ..!{. 
rcs(l<"ct •ml hum•n tlignity. I I< grows p>lc. the blood nuhes from hi• face juS! as thought it lud 
hcen 'hcd. Tlut ;, why ,..• >rc JCCU>tomed lu soy hr ftrh · ..,ounded." . .. 
So one <pe>ks in terms of the most familiar >nd uni•ersally accepted standards of right and wronf 
~~ohcn one rcmarls (I) that racial segreg-ation under government auspices inevitably inOicu humiliation, 
>nJ (l) that ul!icial humili>tion of innocent, l>.,..·abiJing citizens is psychologically injuriow and 
morally ,(\il .. . 
")uri,pru.lcncr: Sruo )"or~ t"nn·mi(T 1.... Rn·irrl'. vol. JO (1955). pp. Hl\--59. 
•• Chulcs . l.a..nncc Ill, "If lie Itoilers Let !lim Go: Rerularing Raci<t Speech on Campus," Dul-t '-­
7"""'"'· - -,-~1_ IY'l{l. rr- 9{11, 909.. ~ly tre>tmcnt of B.-ow• has been much innuenced by this excellent article. 
' "<~ :"."ldinc Sno\.\cn conlcsts the Brorron .:analogy in 1hut ttrms in htr 2niclc: cilcd above:. 
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or heterosexual) supremacy must be kept distinct from uts prcac_hing; while the 
former violates the anti-discrimination principle, the latter is protected by the 
principle of free expression. Q_uestions of the boundary between speech and 
action may present difliculty, but the structure is clear. · 
The point is quite general: the Constitution certainly requires the praaiu of 
republican govcr~ment, due process, and non-establishment of religion, as well 
as non-discrimination. Dut equally central is the principle of free expression, 
which includes the freedom to preach dictatorship, summary justice, theocr-acy 
- or even universal censorship. And so, the argument continues, the same 
principle guaranrees freedom to advocate racist and other inegalitarian doctrines 
- 2s, indeed, many First Amendment decisions firmly establish.S1 
Second, the argument continues, the invocation of Brown to support the 
suppression of racist speech ignores the public-private distinction, which is 
essential to the maintenance not only of free speech hut also of such other civil 
liberties as freedom of religion. IfBrown docs perhaps strike at certain "speech" 
(more precisely, at the communicative clement in certain actions), it is only at 
official speech, which has never been tl10ught protected by a principle of free 
expression. What the First Amendment protects is the right ofprivate individuals 
to deliver those same messages. 
While the equal protection clause might, for example, prohibit a legislature 
from placing a white supremacist slogan on a stale's seal, flag, public buildings, 
and the like, the First Amendment just as firmly protects the freedom of private 
individuals to put t.hat slogan into free competition against more egalitarian ones 
in the marketplace of ideas. Not only the Oag, but also a copy of the Brown 
decision, or a picture of Martin Luther King, can be defaced in public with 
impunity under the first Amendment - though of course, a.o; the civil-libertarian 
usually adds, government officials should denounce such .racist outrages, just 
as university authorities should denounce racist speech on campus while resolutely 
protecting it against coercive inrerfercnce. 
When we tum to look at the world through the civil-rights lens, though, we ~nd much less clarity in the public-private distinction.52 The dvil-rights approach 
seeks to cleanse not only the state but civil society generally of racist and other 
bigoted practices. The formal constitutional expression of the public-private 
distinction, the state action doctrine, tends to break down in the area of 
discrimination law. Nothing approaching a clear line separates (prohibited) official 
10 
C>I/in v. Sm•tlt. S7R 1'.2J 11?7 (7th Clr. 197A). {(tt. J"' irJ iJ6 U.S. ?SJ (1978} : Bra•tknburt v. m;•. J95 U.S.~~ (1969); l'rrmi"itllo L'. Cloito,..,, JJ7 U.S. I (19f9). The Coun h>l reitruu:d the point in Jignilicanr 
Acta In lhe n•g· buming C:OJCJ. "lloe Flm Am.ndmenr cJocs not (UU>ntce th>l other conetpl< \'inv>llr ucrcd 
lo our N>tion >J a " 'hole - Juch u lh< principle th•c di$criminotion on rhe h»is of roce ,is O<lious •nd dcstnrccve 
- wll1 JO unchollenged In <he no>rkciJ!hce of ideu." Ta.., v. J•A~ron, 109 S. Cr. 25JJ, ZSH (1989). "We •re• 
........, tht duecnrion of the n.g b deeply orTcn<ioc ;o many. Out rhe nme might be: sold. for .cnmplc, t>( 
tln!lcnc ctl~nic and reli3iouo epitheu !cicins Ttm(i~irllol• . . .• U•irrJ St•in u. Eitlt,..,•• 110 S . Ct. HOi. 2-110(1990). 
"The reliance o( lr.adiriunal civil·lihcrtics 13\1." on a pubHc .. privalt distinction much srrnngcr 1han we recognize 
rlonmcrc Is the theme of Funk Michdm•n. "Conception• of Democracy in !omeric>n Consticution•l Argument: 
1\c Cue of l'omogr>phy Rcrul•tion." Tm.nm L.,. Rn·i,;,, vol. 56 (1989), p. 291. 
